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Abstract
This paper proposes a public-private insurance scheme for earthquakes and floods in Italy in
which property-owners, the insurer and the government co-operate in risk financing. Our model
departs from the existing literature by describing a public-private insurance intended to relieve the
financial burden that natural events place on governments, while at the same time assisting indi-
viduals and protecting the insurance business. Hence, the business is aiming at maximizing social
welfare rather than profits.
Given the limited amount of data available on natural risks, expected losses per individual have
been estimated through risk-modeling. In order to evaluate the insurer’s loss profile, spatial corre-
lation among insured assets has been evaluated by means of the Hoeffding bound for r-dependent
random variables. Though earthquakes generate expected losses that are almost six times greater
than floods, we found that the amount of public funds needed to manage the two perils is almost the
same. We argue that this result is determined by a combination of the risk aversion of individuals
and the shape of the loss distribution. Lastly, since earthquakes and floods are uncorrelated, we
tested whether jointly managing the two perils can counteract the negative impact of spatial cor-
relation. Some benefit from risk diversification emerged, though the probability of the government
having to inject further capital might be considerable.
Our findings suggest that, when not supported by the government, private insurance might either
financially over-expose the insurer or set premiums so high that individuals would fail to purchase
policies.
1 Introduction
Natural risks pose a broad range of social, financial and economic issues, with potentially long-
lasting effects. Historically, governments have mostly addressed the financial effects of natural events
on an ad-hoc basis, but countries are now increasingly focusing on proactive planning before a disaster
strikes (World Bank, 2014). Among others, OECD, G20 (OECD, 2012), the World Bank and GFDRR
(World Bank, 2014) claim that governments should guide citizens towards recovery by implementing
both risk reduction and financial protection. In particular, the World Bank (2014) argues that “financial
protection complements risk reduction by helping a government address residual risk, which is either not
feasible or not cost effective to mitigate. Absent a sustainable risk financing strategy, [...], a country
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with an otherwise robust disaster risk management approach can remain highly exposed to financial
shocks, either to the government budget or to groups throughout society”.
While guaranteeing social assistance, governments should at the same time encourage private ini-
tiatives in prevention and financial protection. As emphasized by the OECD (2015), improving public
awareness reduces the human-induced factors that make a major contribution to the cost of disasters
and alleviates losses on public finances. In particular, since private insurance is the main risk financ-
ing tool for businesses and households, the OECD (2012) recommends that governments “assess their
availability, adequacy and efficiency to the population and within the economy, as well as their costs
and benefits relative to other types of possible risk reduction measures”.
A series of challenges hinder the development of the insurance business in protection from natural
disasters. First of all, Kousky and Cooke (2012) shows that spatial correlation creates the potential for
enormous losses at the aggregate level, and insurers therefore need to access a large amount of capital in
order to offer the cover and meet solvency constraints. As a consequence, they are often forced to drive
up premiums, which could become so high that it would not be rational for individuals to purchase
the policy. Large insurers can significantly reduce the probability of insolvency by pooling risks from
more independent regions or by transferring a portion of their portfolio through reinsurance. However,
while lowering premiums for regions with a higher risk, this solution might raise those of those with a
lower risk and, especially in a competitive market, low risk-individuals might fail to purchase, therefore
leaving the company with an extremely risky pool. As shown by Charpentier and Le Maux (2014),
the free market does not necessarily provide an efficient level of natural-catastrophe insurance, but
government-supported insurance allows losses from disasters to be spread equally among policyholders
thanks to the government’s easier access to credit.
Climate change also exacerbates these issues: the Geneva Association (2013) warns that return
periods and correlation among claims for several high-loss extreme events are “ambiguous rather than
simply uncertain”, and raises concerns about the future sustainability of insurance business on natural
risks. Social assistance policies may also hinder the development of private markets and increase the
financial burden of natural disasters on public finances due to charity hazard (World Bank, 2014).
Against this background, a number of economies have established various forms of public-private co-
operation to support the insurance business, and several countries have decided to enter the market by
establishing a public-private company entirely devoted to insuring citizens’ properties against natural
disasters at a discounted price (e.g. Spain, France, Australia, Turkey, New Zealand, Taiwan, USA,
etc..) (Consorcio de Compensación de Seguros, 2008).
This work proposes a public-private insurance scheme for Italy. Italy is highly exposed to natural
risks, especially earthquakes and floods, but there is currently no well-defined loss allocation mecha-
nism at national level. A few people insure their properties (Maccaferri et al., 2012) and expect social
assistance from the government instead. Each natural event is evaluated by public authorities when it
occurs, social assistance depends on the decisions of the parties in charge and is therefore commensu-
rate with the financial resources available at the time. In recent years public debate has increasingly
shifted towards natural risk management and planning, although at the moment no initiative has been
undertaken.
In defining the public-private insurance scheme for Italy, our work addresses three issues:
• Loss estimation and lack of data on past losses.
Insurance companies need big loss database for premium rating, but there is currently no source
that collects information on natural impacts in Italy at national level. Lack of data on the impacts
of natural disasters is a widespread issue and in order to overcome this problem, the world’s biggest
insurance companies have developed sophisticated models for loss estimation based on engineering
and geology studies. In this paper, one of these models has been applied to estimate earthquake
losses, while an alternative approach is proposed for floods.
• Public-private insurance model.
Once losses have been estimated, we define a public-private insurance model. Our model departs
from the existing literature by addressing a public-private partnership, which therefore modifies
the fundamental hypotheses of traditional insurance. Our contribution to the literature can be
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summarized in three aspects. First, the purpose of the business is social assistance, and premium
collection serves solely to risk management and to guarantee quick compensation to the damaged
population. Therefore, rates do not include any profit load and are commensurate to citizens’
demand. Second, we introduce the government as a social guarantor that contributes to reserves
and provides public funds in case reserves are not sufficient for claim compensation. Finally,
our model includes spatial correlation by applying the Hoeffding bound for r-dependent random
variables.
• Multi-hazard management.
As well known in finance, merging portfolios is beneficial only if risks are uncorrelated, as floods
and earthquakes are likely to be. It remains to be seen whether the benefits from risk diversifica-
tion counteract the negative impact of spatial correlation. The last part of this work extends the
public-private insurance scheme to multi-hazard management.
The paper presents and discusses results for each of these three aspects. We found that seismic
risk produces the highest expected losses at national level, but floods may generate the highest losses
per square metre. The two perils differ in geographic extent: while the seismic risk involves almost
all the nation, floods concern approximately two thirds of the territory. Though the seismic risk
generates expected losses that are almost six times greater than floods, we found that the amount of
public funds needed to manage them is almost the same. Our analysis shows that the public-private
insurer can benefit from risk differentiation by jointly managing earthquake and flood risks through a
multi-hazard policy: the amount of public capital needed is lower than would be necessary if the two
risks were managed separately. Another desirable feature emerges: rates for multi-hazard policies are
more geographically homogeneous, and therefore promote fairness perception among the population.
However, it emerged that under no circumstances does the maximum premium that individuals are
willing to pay match the insurer capital constraints. Without the government as a guarantor, it would
therefore be impossible for the company to offer policies throughout the territory.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes risk assessment models for flooding and seismic
hazards and concludes presenting expected losses in Italy; Section 3 defines the insurance model for
single hazard policies and applies it to the two risks; Section 4 extends the model to the analysis of
multi-hazard policies; Section 5 concludes.
2 Risk assessment
Expected losses are traditionally estimated from records of past events, but when data are too
scarce or not available, alternative techniques are needed. During the last decades, a new family of
models inferring losses from the characteristics of soil and structures has emerged (Grossi et al., 2005).
According to this branch of literature, risk can be reconstructed as a combination of four components:
• Hazard (H) provides a phenomenon description based on physical measurements, usually fre-
quency, severity and location.
• Exposure (E) identifies the object at risk.
• Vulnerability (V ) defines the relationship between hazard and exposure, quantifying the impact
of the catastrophic event on the property under analysis.
• Loss (L) converts physical damages into monetary values.
Each component is defined on a series of geophysical, engineering or financial variables and relations,
and equally contribute to the overall estimate of risk (Mitchell-Wallace et al., 2017). Through a proper
definition and combination of these components, a risk model should describe the geological or environ-
mental features of the peril in analysis and should also capture differences in impacts on the relevant
structural typologies.
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Although this line of research is growing fast, not many models are currently available and not any
peril has been satisfactorily described. Moreover, these models, while not requiring data on losses, need
a large amount of information on soil, weather, and housing. In addition to the difficulty of finding this
data, models strongly depend on geographical and urban features of the area they have been defined
on, and therefore can hardly be adapted to other territories (Hufschmidt and Glade, 2010; Scorzini and
Frank, 2015).
As far as Italy concerns, current literature offers some analysis that allow to appreciate seismic
risk on the whole territory, while little is still known about floods. We therefore refer to the existing
literature for seismic risk, and develop a new model for flood assessment. Our methodology is similar
to Cesari and D’ Aurizio (2019).
After a brief presentation of the database, the following two subsections present earthquake and
flood risk assessment respectively. Although the two model strongly differ, they both combine the four
risk components as:
Expected monetary damage = L× E ×
∫
V (H)d(H). (1)
After a general description of the model, each of these subsection discuss the components separately.
The section concludes presenting estimated expected losses. Our analysis considers residential housing
only, furniture not included. Multi-hazard risk assessment is postponed to the Section 4.
2.1 Data
There is currently no database collecting records on impacts from natural disasters in Italy, but
some information on national riskiness is available, thought data quality is sometimes questionable. In
particular, our models require data about hazard and exposure.
• Hazard
While seismic hazard is well documented, flood data are strongly affected by the lack of a single
body responsible for physical detection.
Seismic movements are in fact regularly monitored by the National Institute of Geophysics and
Volcanology (INGV), that freely provides daily-updated databases both on past events and about
several seismic indicators. Records are georeferenced and cover almost all the national territory,
indicators are presented for different probability scenarios and associated to an accuracy index.
Data for the analysis of earthquake has been drawn from INGV’s maps of seismic riskiness. On
the other side, flood monitoring is demanded to a number of regional authorities - named “basins’
authorities” - that independently choose collection methods and indicators. These differences in
data collection often leads to inconsistencies and poor comparability among regions (Molinari et
al., 2012). The main database on hydrological risk in Italy is the AVI (“Aree Vulnerate Italiane” -
“Italian Vulnerable Areas”) archive managed by National Research Council (Guzzetti and Tonelli,
2004). The archive collects historical information on flood events in Italy (mainly from 1900 to
2002). However, records are mostly gathered from local journals and, unfortunately, are rarely
suitable to scientific analysis: information are provided in a narrative form, georeferencing is poor,
physical phenomena description is not uniform and data quality depends on the original source
(Molinari et al., 2014). Despite these limitations, the archive is currently among the best repre-
sentation of the flood hazard, and has therefore been used here. Information from the archive have
been integrated with data from “Italian Flood Risk Maps” (EU Directive 2007/60/CE) indicating
the perimeter of geographic areas that could be affected by floods according to three probability
scenarios (Decreto legislativo 23 febbraio 2010 n.4, 2010): extreme events with time to return 500
years (P1); events with time to return of 100-200 years (P2); events with time to return between
20-50 years (P3).
• Exposure
As far as exposure concerns, we refer to the “Mappa dei Rischi dei Comuni Italiani” (“Riski-
ness Map of Italian Municipalities” - MRCI). This database has been created during a recent
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institutional project - “Casa Italia” - to the aim of providing the best representation of major
natural risks in Italy (volcanic, seismic, hydrological, geological). Among several risk indicators,
the database presents a fairly rich representation of Italian real estate. Additional information
on regional average house’s squared metres and the average dwelling value are estimates by the
Revenue Agency (Agenzia delle Entrate, 2015).
2.2 Earthquake
Earthquakes and land movements are among the most studied risks in the literature, but most of
the analysis focus on vulnerability and explore the relationship that links hazard intensity and damage
to buildings. As far as Italy concerns, a few analysis investigate the number of deaths, missing persons
and/or injured people (Cascini et al., 2008; Salvati et al., 2010; Marzocchi et al., 2012), while, to our
knowledge, risk assessment on residential risk is presented in Asprone et al. (2013) only. The latter
model follows the structure specified in eq. (1) and has been tested on the L’Aquila earthquake,
therefore we are referring to it for seismic loss estimates. Some slight modification of the model has
been introduced in order to update the analysis with latest released data on hazard and to consider
a wider range of potential loss scenario. Moreover, our real-estate database provides a more detailed
representation of residential housing, thus allowing for higher accuracy of the estimates.
Damages have been estimated per municipality relating the peak ground acceleration (PGA) and
its exceedance probability λ(PGA) with the existing residential building stock by means of fragility
curves. Given a certain set of “limit states” (LS) representing subsequent level of damage (usually from
“no damage” to “collapse”), a fragility curve describes the probability of reaching a given limit state
as a consequence of the observed PGA, P (LS|PGA). Expected loss can be estimated by comparing
fragility curves of each LS. Damages are then monetarily quantified by means of a function RC(LS)
linking the property’s value to the level of damage.
Literature offers many fragility curves’ models, and we rely on Asprone et al. (2013) selection for
Italy (Table 2). Each model k applies to a number of specific building structures and is defined on
NLSk limit states chosen by the authors to describe the impact of earthquakes on the j-th structure.
Since many models may address the same j-th structure, losses are estimated by averaging results from
the Kj models describing j.
Municipal residential housing stock is divided into five relevant structural typologies - thus fixing
j = 1, . . . , 5 - and seismic losses per square metre ls are computed for each j and each municipality c.
Given the probability Pk (LS + 1|PGA) of the structural typology j of suffering a damage level LS
given a certain PGA, expected losses are estimated as:
lsj,c =
1
Kj
Kj∑
k=1
NLSk∑
LS=1
RC(LS)
∫ ∞
0
[Pk (LS|PGA)− Pj (LS + 1|PGA)] dFc (PGA) =
=
1
Kj
Kj∑
k=1
NLSk∑
LS=1
RC(LS) ·
∫ ∞
0
[Pk (LS|PGA)− Pk (LS + 1|PGA)] |dλc(PGA)d(PGA) |d(PGA). (2)
where Fc(PGA) = 1 − λc(PGA) is the cumulative density function of PGA for the c-th municipal-
ity. According to Asprone et al. (2013), we assume Pk (NLSk + 1|PGA) = 0. Model (2) combines a
probability distribution with domain [0,∞) and a damage function increasing with PGA. PGA is
traditionally expressed in gravity acceleration units g and Asprone et al. (2013) bounds the integration
variable PGA to [0, 2g]. Since we wanted to include as many scenarios as possible, we extended the
domain to include even most unlikely events, and therefore the considered domain is [0,∞).
The five municipal losses estimates have been multiplied by municipal exposure and then aggregated
into municipal total seismic losses Lsc.
Lsc =
5∑
j=1
lsj,c · Esj,c. (3)
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Figure 1: PGA exceedance probability.
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Note: the plot shows the PGA distribution of a random municipality. The nine points are data by INGV, and the red
line represent fitting with the power law distribution.
2.2.1 Hazard
Seismic hazard is represented by PGA and its annual probability of exceedance, which are both
available on the INGV website (Gruppo di Lavoro MPS, 2004) for most of Italy1.
INGV released seismic maps for 9 probabilities of exceedance in 50 years (Meletti and Montaldo,
2007). Those PGA measurements are presented for points in a 0.05 degree grid drawn on the Italian
map. Grid points are defined by longitude and latitude, and can be associated to a municipality by
means of reverse geocoding, that led to the definition of a PGA distribution for over 4600 municipalities.
Sometimes more points referred to the same municipality, hence their average value has been considered.
In order to capture the widest possible representation of the territory, missing municipalities have then
been approximated by averaging the neighbours’ PGA values. However, we failed to represent the whole
national territory since Sardinia and many other small islands cannot be captured by neighborhood
(missing municipalities can be seen in Figure 7). Our database is thus composed of 7685 municipalities.
The 9 INGVmeasurements describe the tail of λ(PGA) for each grid point (a grid point’s PGA curve
example is plotted in Figure 1). Asprone et al. (2013) assumed uniform seismicity in each municipality,
but the known curve’s sections in Figure 1 do not seem to reflect this hypothesis. Moreover, since
the left-side of the curve is missing, classical fitting methodologies led to unsatisfactory results, often
overestimating tails. Therefore, parameters of the distribution have been estimated by regression. Best
fitting results have been obtained by the power law distribution.
In order for the hazard curves to reflect the soil category at the building foundation, O.P.C.M.
3274 (2003) and D.M. 14/01 (2008) state that PGA values at the bedrock should be multiplied by
the stratigraphic SS and topographic ST amplification factors. These factors have been computed by
Colombi et al. (2010) for all the Italian municipalities and kindly provided by INGV.
2.2.2 Exposure
As seismic events differently affect buildings, relevant structural typologies have been identified on
the basis of the information available.
First, the MRCI database divides municipal housing stock into: masonry, reinforced concrete, and
1Sardinia, Alicudi, Filicudi, Panarea, Pantelleria, Pelagie Islands, Stromboli, Ustica not included.
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Table 1: Number of buildings per seismic structural typology.
Material Building Code Buildings (u=1000)
RC gl Reinforced concrete Gravity Load 2853.96
RC sl Reinforced concrete Seismic Load 636.92
M Masonry Gravity Load 6975.98
A gl Other Structures Gravity Load 1406.21
A sl Other Structures Seismic Load 260.88
other; Asprone et al. (2013) argue that buildings of type “other” contain both components of reinforced
concrete and masonry structures, so we assumed this category to be a mixture of these two.
These structures may then have been built in compliance with modern anti-seismic requirements
or not. Since the database does not include this information, we refer to the construction year and
building laws in force. In fact, from 1974 a series of subsequent laws (Legge n. 64, 2 feb, 1974) led
to the progressive re-classification of risk-prone areas, where more restrictive anti-seismic construction
requirements entered into force, thus substantially modifying buildings’ structures. The process ended
in 2003 when anti-seismic laws (O.P.C.M. 3274, 2003) were extended to the whole Italian territory.
Thus, we define reinforced concrete and other structures as seismic loaded if built after these laws
entered into force, or gravity loaded otherwise2. According to Asprone et al. (2013), we assumed
masonry as seismic loaded only. Therefore, we refer to 5 structural typologies (see Table 1) : masonry
(M), and gravity or seismic loaded reinforced concrete (RC.gl and RC.sl), gravity or seismic loaded
other-type structures (A.gl and A.sl).
Since lsj,c is the expected seismic loss of the structure type j in the municipality c per square metres,
Esj,c is obtained by multiplying the number of buildings Bj,c by the average apartment’s surface s¯c
(Agenzia delle Entrate, 2015) and the average number of apartments per building A¯c (ISTAT, census
2015):
Esj,c = s¯c ·Bj,c · A¯c. (4)
2.2.3 Vulnerability
Seismic vulnerability is represented by fragility curves, that provide the probability of exceeding
a certain damage state, given some hazard parameters. Several curves are offered by the seismic
engineering literature, each referring to a specific building structural category. We rely on Asprone et
al. (2013) selection of curves, that is reported in Table 2. The selection contains 5 models for masonry
structures, 11 for reinforced concrete ones, and 1 for the other typology. Each model k is defined on
a different set of NLSk limit states representing building’s structural damage conditions (the last limit
state always corresponds to collapse) and provides one fragility curve for each limit state. Our fragility
curves are log-normally shaped and require PGA values as unique input.
2.2.4 Loss
The loss component is represented by the function RC(LS) transforming structural damages into
monetary losses. We assume that the property value equals its reconstruction cost - on average 1500
euro per square metre, constant among all the municipalities (Agenzia delle Entrate, 2015) - and define
RC(LS) as a fraction of the total reconstruction cost RC through a function RC(LS):
RC(LS) =
(
LS
NLSk
)α
RC. (5)
where each limit state is represented by a positive integer and NLSk is the number of limit states of
model k. According to Asprone et al. (2013), we assume α = 1.
2As far as the year of construction concerns, ISTAT does not specify the exact year in which the building has been
built, but a time interval which is approximately ten-years long. We assumed that the number of buildings constructed
in any year of the interval is constant.
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Table 2: Fragility curves for seismic risk assessment.
Structure Model (k) NLSk
gravity load seismic load
µ σ µ σ
Masonry
Rota et al. (2008) 3
-2.03 0.36
-1.65 0.27
-1.35 0.22
Ahmad et al. (2011) 4
-1.13 0.35
-1.03 0.35
-0.85 0.26
-0.77 0.23
Erberik (2008) 2 -0.47 0.35-0.33 0.35
Lagomarsino and Giovinazzi (2006) 3
-1 0.41
-0.75 0.34
-0.61 0.37
Rota et al. (2010) 3
-0.85 0.24
-0.7 0.18
-0.58 0.14
Reinforced Concrete
Kappos et al. (2003) 4
-1.78 1.14 -1.32 0.29
-1.12 0.8 -0.95 0.27
-0.7 0.63 -0.57 0.27
-0.59 0.57 -0.24 0.28
Spence (2007) 4
-1.01 0.32 -0.87 0.29
-0.55 0.32 -0.46 0.28
-0.28 0.31 -0.02 0.29
-0.09 0.32 0.15 0.27
Crowley et al. (2008) 2 -0.77 0.24 -0.8 0.18-0.62 0.26 -0.61 0.22
Ahmad et al. (2011) 3
-1.07 0.22 -1.07 0.22
-0.91 0.29 -0.91 0.29
-0.59 0.26 -0.44 0.26
Borzi et al. (2007) 2 -0.74 0.32 -0.56 0.32-0.46 0.34 -0.37 0.33
Borzi et al. (2008) 2 -0.68 0.45 -0.41 0.35-0.41 0.36 -0.31 0.35
Kostov et al. (2004) 3
-0.48 0.47 -0.44 0.48
-0.34 0.48 -0.28 0.49
-0.29 0.48 -0.19 0.49
Kwon and Elnashai (2006) 2 -1.08 0.22-0.73 0.22
Ozmen et al. (2010) 2 -0.37 0.35 -0.36 0.3-0.17 0.23 -0.12 0.15
Kappos et al. (2006) 4
-1.57 0.44 -1.14 0.43
-0.92 0.44 -0.57 0.43
-0.67 0.44 -0.18 0.43
-0.51 0.44 0.1 0.43
Tsionis et al. (2011) 2 -0.67 0.27 -0.64 0.28-0.22 0.38 0.18 0.79
Other Kostov et al. (2004) 3
-0.62 0.5 -0.52 0.49
-0.44 0.49 -0.34 0.49
-0.35 0.49 -0.24 0.49
Note: this Table reproduces the selection of seismic fragility curves per building structural typology by Asprone et al.
(2013).
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2.3 Flood
Hydraulic literature offers very little about flood damage in Italy because the lack of uniform data
at national level hinders research in this field. A few studies concern small geographical areas (usually
cities, sometimes sections of river basins) and focus on the estimation of damages in the immediate
follow-up of an event. Most of the analysis study the relationships between some flood’s physical
measurements and expected losses, and the most common output are depth-percent damage curves.
Machine learning techniques have been recently applied to the creation of river basins hazard maps
(Degiorgis et al., 2012; Gnecco et al., 2015). However, these techniques still require quite accurate data
on past loss. Few example of probabilistic risk assessment have been developed for other countries also,
and, similarly to Apel et al. (2006), we decided to extend the deterministic post-event models available
in the literature to probabilistic assessment. In this respect, we estimated expected losses by means
of depth-percent damage curves from the existing literature and additional information on hazard and
exposure from our database. In particular, two functions characterize our model: depth damage curves
g(·) and depth probability, that might be represented by the density fδ(δ), the cumulative distribution
Fδ(δ) and the exceedance probability λ(δ) = 1− Fδ(δ).
Similarly to seismic fragility curves, depth-damage curves refer to structural typologies. In particu-
lar, we consider the buildings’ number of storeys and classify the housing stock into 3 classes (j) - 1, 2
and 3 or more storeys . A sample of depth-damage curves gj(δ) has been selected from the engineering
literature per each structural typology j. Unlike seismic fragility curves, depth-damage curves do not
specify the probability that a given level of depth might produce a certain damage, and return the most
likely outcome only. Moreover, the selected curves are “depth-percent damage”, and indicate damages
as percentages of property’s total value.
Given the building’s reconstruction cost RC, expected flood loss per square metre lfj,c on a j-type
building in the municipality c can be estimated as:
lfj,c =
RC
100
∫ ∞
0
[
gj(δ)|d(λ(δ))dδ |
]
dδ =
RC
100
∫ ∞
0
[
gj(δ)|d[1−Fδ(δ)]dδ |
]
dδ =
RC
100
∫ ∞
0
gj(δ)fδ(δ)dδ. (6)
By construction, there is a value δj,max after which a gj(δ) = 100. Thus, equation (6) can be split in
two parts as:
lfj,c =
RC
100
·
[∫ δmax
0
gj(δ)fδ(δ)dδ + 100 ·
∫ ∞
δmax
fδ(δ)dδ
]
. (7)
Bayes’ theorem allow us to express fδ(δ) as the product of the probability of δ conditional to the
occurrence of at least a flood event fδ|NF (δ|NF ≥ 1) and the probability that at least one flood event
occurs in a year:
fδ(δ) = P (NF ≥ 1)fδ|NF (δ|NF ≥ 1). (8)
When estimating losses, we are considering NF ≥ 1 only, thus substituting eq. (8) into eq. (7) leads
to:
lfj,c =
RC
100
· P (NF ≥ 1) ·
[∫ δmax
0
gj(δ)fδ|NF (δ|NF ≥ 1)dδ + 100 ·
∫ ∞
δmax
fδ|NF (δ|NF ≥ 1)dδ
]
. (9)
Since
∫∞
δmax
fδ|NF (δ|NF ≥ 1)dδ = 1− Fδ|NF (δmax|NF ≥ 1) = λδ|NF (δmax|NF ≥ 1), the model becomes:
lfj,c =
RC
100
· P (NF ≥ 1) ·
[∫ δmax
0
gj(δ)fδ|NF (δ|NF ≥ 1)dδ + 100 · λδ|NF (δmax|NF ≥ 1)
]
. (10)
Loss estimates per square metre per municipality and structural typology are multiplied by municipal
exposure and aggregated into municipal flood losses Lfc
Lfc =
3∑
j=1
lfj,c · Efj,c. (11)
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Figure 2: Flood frequency distribution.
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Note: the plot divides observations (points) in two clusters: records from municipalities with 0 < P2 < 0.5 and P2 ≥ 0.5.
Both the clusters have been fitted with a negative binomial, as shown by the black and red lines.
2.3.1 Hazard
Flood hazard has been represented by frequency and depth probabilities. Both the distributions
have been estimated from the AVI database and fitted by means of non-parametric techniques due to
the lack of data. Since AVI gathers information from local press, it is likely that most remote events
have not been captured. In particular, the number of floods listed after 1900 in the AVI archive is much
higher than those recorded before and therefore we considered events occurred from that date onward
only. Unfortunately, only 795 events remain and they are too few to fit distributions at municipal level.
Frequency has been described by the probability density function of the number of floods in a year
fNF (NF ). In order to capture differences between the frequency of occurrence among the municipalities,
data have been divided into two clusters - AP1 (120 obs.) and AP2 (620 obs.) - on the basis of the
hydrological hazard index P2 from MRCI. Figure 2 shows that frequencies fAPNF approximate negative
binomial behaviour in both the two clusters. Despite the curves appear so close, they strongly differ in
mean (the average number of floods per year is 11.95 in AP1 and 42.58 in AP2).
The probability of flood returns in each cluster is then adapted to fit the municipal and individual
risk: since each flood involves a certain number of municipalities within the cluster AP , the municipal
probability of experiencing at least one flood in a year is estimated by multiplying fAPNF times the average
number c¯f of municipalities flooded in AP over the number of municipalities NAPc in AP :
F cNF (1) =
(
1− fAPNF (0)
) c¯f
NAPc
c ∈ AP . (12)
Floods usually strike several municipalities at the same time, but not all the properties in a flooded
municipality will be hit by the flood. Therefore, the individual flood frequency does not coincide with
the municipal one. We approximated the individual frequency probability by means of the P3 index
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Figure 3: Depth probability distribution.
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Note: the dotted line is the empirical distribution fδ|NF (δ|NF ≥ 1), and colored lines shows fitting.
in MRCI3, that indicates the percentage of municipal surface flooded in a 20-50 years probabilistic
scenario. We indicate the index as extP3. Assuming homogeneously distributed buildings among the
municipal area, the individual probability of flood returns is:
P (NF ≥ 1) = F cNF (1) · extc,P3. (13)
In addition to frequency, we estimate the probability of water to reach a certain depth during a flood.
Depth information are missing for most of the events in the AVI database and sometimes are replaced
by hydrometric heights measuring water depth from the river bed. We excluded hydrometric heights
and assumed that depth levels reported in the database always correspond to the maximum reached in
the area, which is a reasonable hypothesis since records in AVI are largely gathered from local press or
compensation claims.
We found no significant difference in depth distributions between differently-exposed areas AP
but this may be due to the low amount of available data, and therefore decided to estimate a unique
function fδ|NF (δ|NF ≥ 1) for the entire national territory. Since a flood usually hits more municipalities,
a number of depth measurements are often reported for the same event but we represented each event
with the maximum depth reported in the database. Hence, estimates have been computed on 475
observations.
The depth empirical distribution estimated from AVI data fδ|NF (δ|NF ≥ 1) is shown in Figure
3, where a graphical comparison between some distributions is presented too. Satisfactory fittings
have been reached with the Generalized Beta (GB), the Generalized Gamma (GG) and the Gamma
distributions. Table 3 shows that GG and GB’s led to similar sum of squared errors and sum of
absolute errors, while errors are much higher for the Gamma. The Chi squared goodness of fit test
confirms the higher performance of GG and GB with respect to the Gamma, even though none of them
3Indicators P3 are not available for the entire Italian territory, since data are missing for part of Marche and Emilia-
Romagna Regions.
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Table 3: Flood depth distribution, goodness of fit.
SSE SAE
Gamma 0.02194857 0.2493763
GG 0.01328367 0.1951612
GB 0.01444061 0.2024778
Note: this Table shows the sum of squared errors (SSE) and sum of absolute errors (SAE) obtained when fitting flood
depth distribution with Gamma, Generalized Gamma (GG) and Generalized Beta (GB) distributions.
reached a positive outcome. However, the likelihood ratio test shows weak evidence that the GG is
more appropriate, therefore the Gamma has been chosen because of computational advantages.
2.3.2 Exposure
When evaluating structural vulnerability to floods, the number of storeys of the building is a funda-
mental feature to take into account. Therefore, buildings have been classified in three groups according
to the number of storeys - one, two and three or more - in MRCI. Another element significantly affecting
buildings resistance to floods is the presence/absence of a basement floor; since this information is not
available, we assumed the two features to be equally distributed.
Given the number of buildings per structural typology within the municipality Bj,c, the average
number of apartments per building A¯c (ISTAT, census 2015) and the average apartment’s surface s¯c
(Agenzia delle Entrate, 2015), exposure has been estimated as:
Efj,c = s¯c ·Bj,c · A¯c. (14)
Table 4: Number of buildings per number of storeys.
Number of Storeys Buildings (u=1000)
1 2083.39
2 5981.26
3 or more 4123.05
2.3.3 Vulnerability
Flood’s vulnerability is evaluated by depth damage curves defined on the building’s number of
storeys. The most widely adopted curves in hydraulic literature express damage as a percentage of
building’s total value and therefore called “depth-damage curves”. Conversely to the curves expressing
damages in absolute values, percentages curves are not affected by monetary volatility and are more
reliable (Appelbaum, 1985).
Many studies have led to the definition of different depth-percent damage curves, that are strongly
geographical-dependent (Scorzini and Frank, 2015): being derived from the analysis of historical data,
they are in fact defined on the characteristics of the area under analysis and tend to lose accuracy when
applied to contexts whose urban and territorial features differ too much from the original site.
We have selected depth-percent damage curves from six previous works (Appelbaum, 1985; Arrighi
et al., 2013; Debo, 1982; Genovese, 2006; Luino et al., 2009; Oliveri and Santoro, 2000), all either defined
or tested on Italian data. The selection is reported in Figure 4. Selected curves per structural typology
have then been averaged into three new curves in order to guarantee higher reliability of results at the
national level. Curves have been fitted by polynomial regressions, as shown in Figure 5.
2.3.4 Loss
Structural damages have been converted into monetary terms by means of the function RC100 . Similar
to the seismic model, we assume that the property value is equal to its reconstruction cost - on average
12
Figure 4: Depth-percent damage curves for flood risk assessment.
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1500 euro per square metre, constant among all the municipalities (Agenzia delle Entrate, 2015).
2.4 Results
Earthquake and flood losses have been estimated per municipality and structural typology. Seismic
risk is described in Table 5, where results from Asprone et al. (2013) are also reported for compari-
son. We can note that, though the model adopted is the same, huge differences emerge between the
two analysis. Several reasons contribute to these discrepancies and should be discussed for a better
understanding results.
First of all, (i) estimates are highly sensitive to the probability distribution of hazard intensities, and
while λ(PGA) has been here fitted from INGV data, Asprone et al. (2013) rely on some distributional
assumption. In addition, (ii) we assumed PGA values ranging in [0,∞[, while the previous analysis
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Figure 5: Depth-percent damage curves.
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show the functions fitted by polynomial regression.
considers [0, 2g] only. (iii) INGV data on PGA fails to represent many smaller municipalities that
have here been approximated by means of neighbours’ values and this assumption may have further
contributed to the differences in results. (iv) Exposure strongly affect results too and while MRCI
collects the number of dwellings per structural typology at the municipal level, Asprone et al. (2013)
had information at the provincial level only. Moreover, MRCI refers to the 2011 population census,
while the database used by Asprone et al. (2013) date back to 10 years earlier.
Arguments (i)-(iv) determine the different loss scenario, and, in particular, Table 5 shows that
estimated loss per square metre obtained by our model are considerably lower than those of Asprone et
al. (2013). The main reason is the adoption of a power law distribution that concentrates the probability
on weaker events. However, our model highlights the gap in expected losses between more and less
fragile buildings more than the older version.
Though our losses per square metre are lower than previous findings, the second column of the Table
5 (max(lsj,c)) describe similar patterns. By contrast, expected losses per municipality and structural
typology Lsj,c in the third column do not even show the same pattern. As argued before, exposure
strongly affect results and the detailed information on buildings in MRCI allowed us to better repre-
sent real estate assets. In fact, Rome is the biggest municipality in Italy, and therefore its exposure
produces expected losses that are extremely higher than those of other municipalities. By contrast, the
homogeneous distribution of provincial structures among the municipalities in Asprone et al. (2013)
very likely underestimates the exposure of major areas.
The fundamental role of exposure becomes clear when comparing lsj,c and L
s
j,c geographically. Fig-
ure 6 represents the expected loss per square metre on the most vulnerable buildings - the masonry
structures - in each municipality. The map reflects the hazard component of the risk model and clearly
shows the proximity to risk sources. By contrast, this pattern in risk distribution is not evident in
Figure 7 showing annual total expected losses per municipality. In fact, the risky dark area delimited
in Figure 6 largely corresponds to the Appennino mountain chain, where several municipalities are
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Table 5: Estimated seismic expected losses.
Structure max(lsj,c) (euro) max(L
s
j,c)(Mln euro) tot L
s
j (Mln euro)
λ(PGA) ∼ PL
RC.gl 10.53 Castelbaldo (Padova) 216.79 Roma 2223.61
RC.sl 3.83 Castelbaldo (Padova) 3.54 Roma 130.70
A.gl 4.03 Castelbaldo (Padova) 7.16 Roma 233.76
A.sl 3.22 Castelbaldo (Padova) 0.43 Roma 30.73
M 12.69 Castelbaldo (Padova) 109.54 Roma 3615.87
tot 6234.661
Asprone (2013)
RC.gl 17.04 Giarre (Catania) 51.5 Roma 1186.8
RC.sl 11.34 Navelli (L’Aquila) 8.0 Reggio di Calabria 489.9
A.gl 14.51 Giarre (Catania) 25.1 Roma 667.2
A.sl 11.71 Navelli (L’Aquila) 2.4 Napoli 174.0
M 29.99 Giarre (Catania) 196.4 Roma 8661.8
tot 11179.6
Note: the table lists some descriptive statistics about estimated seismic expected losses per structural typology; in order:
maximum expected loss per square metre lfj,c, maximum expected loss at the municipal level L
s
j,c and the total expected
loss Lsj . The upper part describes current results, obtained by fitting PGA with a power law distribution; the lower side
reports results by Asprone et al. (2013) for comparison.
Table 6: Estimated flood expected losses.
Structure max(lfj,c)(euro) max(L
f
j )(Mln euro) tot L
f
j (Mln euro)
1 storey 19.61 Vigarano Mainarda (Ferrara) 7.93 S. Michele al T. (Venezia) 105.75
2 storeys 15.16 Vigarano Mainarda (Ferrara) 36.53 Ferrara 536.14
3 storeys 11.56 Vigarano Mainarda (Ferrara) 18.24 Rimini 234.01
tot 875.90
Note: the Table shows descriptive statistics of flood expected losses per number of storeys. In order: maximum expected
loss per square metre lfj,c, maximum expected loss at the municipal level L
f
j,c and the total expected loss L
f
j .
sparsely inhabited. On the other hand, densely populated municipalities on the coast do not show
extremely high level of loss per square metre but reach the highest expected losses at the aggregate
level because of large real estates.
In order to appreciate the effect of different hazard and exposure components, one can consider re-
inforced concrete gravity loaded structures: though the power law distribution gets to a lower max(lsj,c),
the associated estimate of the expected loss Lsj,c in Rome is four times greater than that obtained in
the previous paper.
Our analysis of seismic risk led to total expected loss equal to 6234.66 million, which is almost half
the value obtained by Asprone et al. (2013). The value is seven times greater than the expected loss
estimated for flood risk, equal to 875.90 million per year, thus indicating that the earthquakes are the
natural hazard of main concern in Italy.
As far as flood losses concern, main findings are presented in Table 6. Maximum losses per square
metre lfj,c are higher than the seismic ones, but Figure 8 shows that a great part of the territory does
not appear to be affected by hydrological risk and most municipalities are associated to values of lfj,c
close to 0. The map shows that the risk mostly affects northern Italy, and in particular the Emilia-
Romagna, Veneto and Lombardia regions. More or less the same risk distribution is obtained at the
aggregate level in Figure 9, where the effect of exposure highlights additional areas of interest, such as
the north-west coast, north Sardinia and Rome.
By comparing Figures 7 and 9, we can observe that north-east Italy is highly affected by both the
two hazards, though the effect of floods remains consistently limited with respect to that of earthquakes.
To conclude, Table 7 ranks the fifteen largest expected municipal losses per each hazard. One can notice
that three cities in Emilia-Romagna are listed for both: Bologna, Ravenna and Rimini.
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Figure 6: Seismic expected loss per square metre (masonry buildings).
Note: the minimum value is lsj,c = 0.025, maximum is 12.69, and average value is 2.23 euro per square metre.
Figure 7: Expected seismic annual loss per municipality.
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Figure 8: Flood expected loss per square metre (one-storey buildings)
Note: “Not at risk” identifies municipalities where lfj,c = 0. Among the other municipalities, the minimum loss is 2.24e
−08.
Maximum value is lfj,c = 19.61. On average, expected loss in risky areas (municipalities “Not at risk” not included) is 0.37
euro per square metre.
Figure 9: Expected flood annual loss per municipality.
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Table 7: Municipalities with higher expected loss per natural risk.
Seismic Expected Loss
Municipality Province Region Lsc(Mln euro)
1 Roma Roma Lazio 337.46
2 Napoli Napoli Campania 114.03
3 Bologna Bologna Emilia-Romagna 105.26
4 Verona Verona Veneto 59.58
5 Firenze Firenze Toscana 58.55
6 Torino Torino Piemonte 45.17
7 Reggio di Calabria Reggio di Calabria Calabria 43.23
8 Modena Modena Emilia-Romagna 39.57
9 Prato Prato Toscana 33.36
10 Terni Terni Umbria 33.03
11 Ravenna Ravenna Emilia-Romagna 31.69
12 Rimini Rimini Emilia-Romagna 30.38
13 Messina Messina Sicilia 29.92
14 Pistoia Pistoia Toscana 29.50
15 Catania Catania Sicilia 29.14
Flooding Expected Loss
Municipality Province Region Lfc (Mln euro)
1 Ferrara Ferrara Emilia-Romagna 56.22
2 Ravenna Ravenna Emilia-Romagna 52.89
3 Rimini Rimini Emilia-Romagna 45.03
4 Pisa Pisa Toscana 37.33
5 San Michele al Tagliamento Venezia Veneto 34.48
6 Jesolo Venezia Veneto 27.83
7 Parma Parma Emilia-Romagna 23.51
8 Bologna Bologna Emilia-Romagna 21.63
9 San Donà di Piave Venezia Veneto 21.31
10 Cesenatico Forlì-Cesena Emilia-Romagna 17.02
11 Piacenza Piacenza Emilia-Romagna 16.05
12 Cervia Ravenna Emilia-Romagna 15.40
13 Verbania Verbano-Cusio-Ossola Piemonte 14.58
14 Forlì Forlì-Cesena Emilia-Romagna 13.33
15 Abano Terme Padova Veneto 12.94
3 Public-private insurance model
When constructing an insurance scheme, two fundamental quantities should be carefully evaluated:
the premium per policyholder and the amount of reserves needed for the business given the solvency
constraint. In the private market, insurers aim at profit and constitutes reserves through premium’s
collection. Therefore, rates should be sufficiently high to yield profit and avoid unacceptable levels of
loss, while at the same time meeting an acceptable level of risk. Moreover, in order for the policy to
be purchased, premiums should also meet the demand. Premium rating can hence be represented as
a typical decision problem of profit and utility maximizing agents (Mossin, 1968; Ehrlich and Becker,
1972). However, when the government takes over the market, it radically changes the management
objectives of the insurance company, and the traditional model is no longer suitable to capture agent’s
behavior. In this respect, this section presents a public-private insurance model for natural disasters
where homeowners, insurers and government cooperate in risk financing.
Although the traditional private insurance-model has to be suitably modified to describe a public-
private partnership, the problem can still be represented by comparing two perspectives: on the one
hand, individuals who are willing to spend up to a certain amount on coverage; on the other hand, the
insurer who, supported by the government, offers the policy subject to some solvency constraints. The
next two Subsections address the problem on the demand and supply perspectives respectively.
On the demand side, individuals face a standard decision problem and their utility functions can
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be defined as in the private-market literature. We keep the standard assumption of perfect information
and rationality of individuals, though these hypotheses are often criticized as inappropriate to describe
real world conditions (Goda et al., 2015).4 These criticisms are extremely important for the private
market, but less relevant to our analysis since governments have the ability to modify the behavior of
individuals by investing in risk education, promoting public awareness or introducing the obligation to
purchase the policy.
On the supply side, the goal of insurance business is substantially affected by the partnership with
the government. In the free market, insurer’s goal is profit maximization subject to survival and/or
stability constraints that require low ruin probability and low probability of high operational costs
(Goda et al., 2015). By contrast, when entering the business, the government forces insurers to set
the lowest premium possible given both the demand and the solvency constraints. Our model departs
from traditional literature by assuming that the business endorses social welfare and therefore rates
do not include profit-load. On the other side the government also supports the business by relaxing
its financial burden: it partially subsidises reserves through capital injections and contributes to the
reimbursement whenever stored funds are not sufficient for claim compensation.
Several additional issues arise in specifying the supply side. In particular, insurers’ solvency con-
straint refer to the aggregate loss distribution, which is difficult to represent due to lack of information.
While expected losses can be reconstructed through risk modeling as in Section 2, particular attention
should be devoted to the variance as spatial correlations strongly affect insurer’s potential of extreme
losses. Quantifying correlation is difficult when records of past events are available, and it is practically
impossible when they are not. However, it is reasonable to assume that spatial correlation between
municipalities depends on their proximity, so that it can be identified a sufficiently large threshold r
such that two municipalities that are at least r-km far away are independent. We assume r = 50 km,
and include spatial correlation by means of the Hoeffding bound for r-dependent variables.
In addition to risk quantification, private insurers are also affected by state regulations, market
competition (Grossi et al., 2005) and social or political decisions that may result in moral hazard and
adverse selection (Kunreuther and Pauly, 2009). Coordinating government and insurers actions can
prevent these drawbacks, that should therefore not be included in the public-private model.
Finally, agents’ attitudes toward risk should also be carefully evaluated. While in the literature
is widespread agreed that homeowners are risk-averse, some evidence suggests that insurers may also
exhibit risk-aversion (Gollier, 2013). Actuarial practice also encourages cautious behaviors, emphasizing
the importance of adjusting rates by a risk-load component proportional to aggregate loss variance for
extraordinary uncertain events such as natural hazards (Kunreuther, 1996; Larsen and Kuzak, 2005).
However, by entering the business as a guarantor, the government release the insurer from its strict
capital constraint and there is no need for the insurer to over-protect the reserves. We thus assume
risk-averse homeowners and a risk-neutral insurer.
The two agent’s perspectives are combined in Subsection 3.3 where the insurance scheme is defined.
The application to Italian data is discussed in the following Subsection, and results for both the two
hazards conclude the Section. Four different policies have been estimated and, thought seismic risk
generates highest expected losses, the analysis shows that almost the same amount of public funds is
necessary to manage the two risks. This section discusses single hazards policies only, multi-hazard
analysis follows in the next Section.
3.1 Homeowner’s purchase decision
Since the seminal papers by Mossin (1968) and Ehrlich and Becker (1972), several premium setting
models on insurance purchase decision have been developed. These models describe policies offered by
the private sector and set premiums by comparing the risk-averse individual’s willingness to pay with
4Common shared information between insurer and insured is questionable in real contexts (Cooper and Hayes, 1987;
Kunreuther and Pauly, 1985). In addition to lack of data for risk assessment, individuals also have to face limited cognitive
capacity (Kahneman, 2003; Goda et al., 2015) and imperfect rationality: Kunreuther (1996) asserts that policy adoption
conveys individual risk perception; Palm (1995) observes that appreciation of earthquake policies’ benefits depends on
personal attitude, socioeconomic and demographic characteristics, proximity to physical hazards, and past experience.
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the profit maximization sought by the insurer. Thought we are considering a public-private partnership,
individual’s willingness to pay is left substantially unchanged. This subsection deals with the demand
side, defines the utility function of the owners and gets to the maximum premium that they are willing
to pay.
Let us consider a single peril insurance (i.e. earthquakes or floods only) in Italy. Any generic
homeowner i has an mi square metres property. The Ni individuals gather in municipalities, thus any i
belongs to a generic Italian municipality c. A negative event has an annual probability 1− pic(0) to hit
the Municipality c and ruin the i-th individual property at time t causing a loss lai,t per square metre.
Consider discrete time period t equal to one year.
Individual i may incur in a loss lai,t with probability 1−pic(0), i ∈ c. This loss affects his wealth wi,t,
that we assume equal to the house value for simplicity. However, the individual may buy an insurance
coverage and pay a premium pi,t per square metre to get a reimbursement xi,t per square metre in case
that the event occurs. Let us define xi,t as a function of the actual loss lai,t:
xi,t =
{
0, with probability pic(0),
x
(
lai,t
)
, with probability 1− pic(0), 0 < x
(
lai,t
)
≤ lai,t,
(15)
with i ∈ c and
x
(
lai,t
)
=

0 if lai,t ≤ D,
lai,t −D if D < lai,t < E +D,
E if lai,t ≥ E +D,
(16)
where D and E are the deductible and the maximum coverage provided per square metre by the insurer.
The homeowner’s utility of not being insured is traditionally expressed as the sum of two components
representing the case of no events occurring during the year and a unique loss scenario:
Unot insured = pic(0)u(wi,t) + (1− pic(0))u(wi,t − lai,tmi,t). (17)
Similarly, the utility of purchase is defined as:
Uinsured = pic(0)u(wi,t − pi,tmi,t) + (1− pic(0))u(wi,t − pi,tmi,t − lai,tmi,t + x
(
lai,t
)
mi,t). (18)
Therefore, assuming rational behaviour, we can assume that the homeowner will buy an insurance
coverage for its property if and only if its utility of purchasing is greater than or equal to that of not
purchasing the policy: Uinsured ≥ Unot insured.
Considering any possible loss level, hence any possible phenomena intensity ζ, we can define the
probability pic(ζ) that c will experience a ζ-intensity event in a year and that the homeowner i living
in municipality c will suffer a loss lai,t(ζ) expressed as a function of ζ. In case he is owning a residential
insurance coverage, its claim value will be then:
xi,t =
{
0, with probability pic(0),
x
(
lai,t(ζ)
)
, with probability pic(ζ), 0 < x
(
lai,t(ζ)
)
≤ lai,t,
with i ∈ c. (19)
with
x
(
lai,t(ζ)
)
=

0 if lai,t(ζ) ≤ D,
lai,t(ζ)−D if D < lai,t(ζ) < E +D,
E if lai,t(ζ) ≥ E +D
(20)
and the insured purchase-convenience condition becomes:
pic(0) · u(wi,t) +
∫ ∞
0
pic(ζ) · u(wi,t − lai,t(ζ)mi,t)dζ
≤ pic(0) · u(wi,t − pi,tmi,t) +
∫ ∞
0
pic(ζ) · u(wi,t − pi,tmi,t − lai,t(ζ)mi,t + x
(
lai,t(ζ)
)
mi,t)dζ. (21)
20
According to the traditional literature on insurance purchasing decision, we assume the individual to
be risk-averse and we represent its preferences by means of the utility function u(x) = log(x+ 1). We
set wi,t equal to the house value and assume for simplicity that it corresponds to the reconstruction
cost, equal to RC per square metre. The logarithmic specification allows us to simplify the model
considering losses per square metre, so we can rewrite eq. (21) as:
pic(0) · log(RC + 1) +
∫ ∞
0
pic(ζ) log(RC − lai,t(ζ) + 1)dζ
≤ pic(0) · log(RC − pi,t + 1) +
∫ ∞
0
pic(ζ) log(RC − pi,t − lai,t(ζ) + x
(
lai,t(ζ)
)
+ 1)dζ. (22)
We assume that the premium pi,t is fixed at t = 0 and does not vary with respect to time, pi,t = pi,
and neither do inhabited square metres, so mi,t = mi. We can compute the highest premium that
homeowners are willing to pay by restricting condition in eq. (22) to the equality, obtaining:
pic(0) · log (RC + 1)
(RC − pi + 1) +
∫
pic(ζ) log
(RC − lai,t(ζ) + 1)
(RC − pi − lai,t(ζ) + x
(
lai,t(ζ)
)
+ 1)
dζ = 0. (23)
This equality states that the individual is indifferent to the decision to purchase the policy or not,
and allows us to derive the risk-based maximum premium pHi that the individual is willing to pay per
structural typology and municipality.
3.2 Public-private partnership
We now consider the supply side, where the insurer and the government cooperate in risk manage-
ment. As previously discussed, the goal of the business is maximizing social well-being, while financially
protecting the insurer. Therefore, the government forces insurers to apply the lowest possible premiums,
given both the demand and the solvency constraints, and offers its support to the business by partially
subsidising reserves and committing to pay reimbursements whenever the reserve is not sufficient for
claim compensation.
As the demand can be represented through the maximum premium that individuals are willing to
pay, supply is concerned about the constitution of reserves in order to cope with possible future claims.
At the beginning of the activity, say t = 0, the insurer should create a reserve W , that will be increased
every year by annual premiums pi collected from the Ni individuals. Since the government supports
the insurers, the reserve is partially subsidises by public capitals. Assume for simplicity that all the
premiums are paid at the beginning of the year, while claims are paid when experienced. Hence, a
minimum capital requirement Wd should be fixed, so that the government will have to pay Wd in t = 0
and to refill the fund at the end of the year t if Wt goes below this threshold. So, at the beginning (b)
of the year t = 0 the initial reserve W b0 is created:
W b0 = Wd +
Ni∑
i=1
pimi, (24)
and at the end (e) of the year it will be decreased of the total amount of reimbursement paid during
the year:
W e0 = W
b
0 −
Ni∑
i=1
xi,0mi. (25)
Since claims x
(
lai,t(ζ)
)
may incur at any random time t and more events may happen close in time,
the minimum capital requirement Wd is necessary to guarantee money availability for reimbursement
with a sufficiently high probability. Thus, if W e0 < Wd the government will refill it with an additional
amount Wr = Wd −W e0 .
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At any subsequent time t, the fund value at the beginning of the year is:
W bt = Wt−1 +
Ni∑
i=1
pimi with Wt−1 = max(W et−1;Wd), (26)
while at the end it will be:
W et = W
b
t −
Ni∑
i=1
xi,tmi. (27)
However, the insurer is legally asked to meet some solvency constraint and hence need the government to
setWd such that the probability of not being able to promptly pay the claims (“insolvency” probability)
below a certain low value 1.
Let us assume that a negative event hits any building within a municipality. We assume that every
policy can generate at most one claim per year and per individual; since reconstructing or restoring a
building requires long time, this hypothesis is reasonable. Moreover, assume that actual square metre
losses lai,t are equal for all the individuals within the same municipality and so does xi,t. Consider the
Nc municipalities in Italy and indicate the total number of inhabited squared metres in the municipality
c as Mc, we have:
Mc =
∑
i∈c
mi,
∑
i∈c
xi,tmi = Xc,tMc, hence Xc,t =
∑
i∈c xi,tmi
Mc
, (28)
so we can compute the total amount of claims as:
Yt =
Ni∑
i=1
xi,tmi =
Nc∑
c=1
∑
i∈c
xi,tmi =
Nc∑
c=1
Xc,tMc. (29)
Since our policy covers at most one claim per year and per individual, claim occurrence per year and
per municipality can be modelled as a Bernoulli random variable X¯c,t ∼ Ber(qc) Olivieri and Pitacco
(2010)
X¯c,t =
{
1 with probability qc,
0 with probability 1− qc.
(30)
with qc = pic (ζ > ζD) and ζD such that lai,t(ζD) = D.
We can rewrite Yt as:
Yt =
Nc∑
c=1
Xc,tMc =
Nc∑
c=1
McX¯c,tx
(
lac,t,j
)
=
Nc∑
c=1
X¯c,t
∑
j
Mj,cx
(
lac,t,j
)
=
Nc∑
c=1
X¯c,tac,t, (31)
where j indicates the structural typology and Mj,c is the number of squared metres of properties of
type j in municipality c.
A main issue related to covering natural disasters is the high level of correlation between individual
risks, which makes the description of the probability distribution of Yt non-trivial. There is no physical
bound for energy propagation and this means that we cannot consider municipalities as perfectly
independent among each other, especially in the earthquakes’ case. By the way, natural phenomena
hit neighbour cities, but far enough municipalities fairly never experience the same event. Therefore,
it could be found a certain distance r such that municipalities whose centroids are at least r km far
are independent. This assumption is similar to the Hoeffding (1963)’s definition of (r− 1)-dependence,
and allows us to follow his work to model the national claim amount Yt.
We sample municipalities in Ng groups Y g of independent units, namely we create the groups in
such a way that all the municipalities within a group are at least r km apart from each other. The
number ng of municipalities in group g varies.
The total amount of claims in Italy can thus be obtained as:
Yt = Y
1
t + Y
2
t + Y
3
t + · · ·+ Y Ngt , (32)
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with
Y gt =
∑
c∈g
X¯c,tac,t, c = 1, . . . , ng. (33)
Each group claim amount Y gt is the sum of ng independent and bounded random variables.
Assuming that the hazard distribution does not vary with respect to time too, expected losses do
not depend on t, and neither do E [Yt] and E [Y
g
t ]. Considering that
∫ ζD
0 pic(ζ)x
[
laj,c (ζ)
]
dζ = 0, the
g-th group expected value:
E [Y gt ] = E [Y
g] =
∑
c∈g
∑
j
Mj,c
∫ ∞
0
pic(ζ)x
[
laj,c (ζ)
]
dζ =
∑
c∈g
∑
j
Mj,c · E
[
x
(
laj,c
)]
. (34)
The expected total amount of claims in Italy is:
E [Yt] = E [Y ] =
Ng∑
g=1
E [Y g] . (35)
Now we can define the insolvency probability at time t, and impose an upper bound 1 on it:
Prob
{
Wt−1 +
Ni∑
i=1
pimi − Yt < 0
}
< 1, (36)
or equivalently:
Prob
{
Yt > Wt−1 +
Ni∑
i=1
pimi
}
< 1. (37)
We consider the worst case scenario Wt−1 = Wd:
Prob
{
Yt > Wd +
Ni∑
i=1
pimi
}
< 1. (38)
The minimum capital requirement Wd that the government should guarantee is then obtained by ap-
plying the Hoeffding (1963) bound to our weighted sum of independent and bounded random variables:
Prob
{
Yt > Ncφ+ E [Y ]
}
<
Ng∑
g=1
wge
−h1φE
[
e
h1
ng
(Y gt −E[Y g ])
]
, h1 > 0, (39)
with wg =
ng
Nc
.
Set
Wd +
Ni∑
i=1
pimi = Ncφ+ E [Y ] , (40)
and fix the right hand side of eq. (39) equal to 1:
1 =
Ng∑
g=1
wge
−h1φE
[
e
h1
ng
(Y gt −E[Y g ])
]
= e−h1φ
Ng∑
g=1
wgE
[
e
h1
ng
Y gt e
− h1
ng
E[Y g ]
]
=
= e−h1φ
Ng∑
g=1
wge
− h1
ng
E[Y g ]
E
[
e
h1
ng
Y gt
]
= e−h1φ
Ng∑
g=1
wge
− h1
ng
E[Y g ]
E
[
e
h1
ng
∑
c∈g X¯c,tac,t
]
.
(41)
The last expected value in eq. (41) is the moment generating function of the sum of random variables
MY gt
(
h1
ng
)
:
E
[
e
h1
ng
∑
c∈g X¯c,tac,t
]
=
∏
c∈g
MY gt
(
h1
ng
)
=
∏
c∈g
MX¯c,tac,t
(
h1
ng
)
, (42)
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hence eq. (41) can be rewritten as:
1 = e
−h1φ
Ng∑
g=1
wge
− h1
ng
E[Y g ]∏
c∈g
MX¯c,tac,t
(
h1
ng
)
. (43)
Solving eq. (43) we obtain φ as:
φ =
1
h1
log

∑Ng
g=1wge
− h1
ng
E[Y g ]∏
c∈gMX¯c,tac,t
(
h1
ng
)
1
 (44)
and estimate Wd from eq. (40):
Wd = Ncφ+ E [Y ]−
Ni∑
i=1
pimi. (45)
Eq. (45) may result in a negative value of Wd, but we bind possible solutions to
W ∗d ≥ 0. (46)
In case ofWd < 0, we assume that the government will decide to set it equal to 0 and keep an insolvency
probability even lower than the desired level: ∗1 ≤ 1.
Moreover, it is reasonable to suppose that the government aims to minimize the probability to refill
the fund with additional capital Wr = Wd −W et , so it will need to set a premium sufficiently high to
guarantee a low probability bounded from above by 2 to pay that quantity at any time t:
Prob
{
Wd −W et > 0
}
= Prob
{
Wd −Wt−1 −
Ni∑
i=1
pimi + Yt > 0
}
< 2. (47)
Once again, consider the worst case scenario Wt−1 = Wd:
Prob
{
Wd −Wd −
Ni∑
i=1
pimi + Yt > 0
}
= Prob
{
Yt −
Ni∑
i=1
pimi > 0
}
< 2, (48)
or equivalently:
Prob
{
Yt >
Ni∑
i=1
pimi
}
< 2. (49)
Note that this condition applies a new constraint on the premiums’ value.
Given a sufficiently low probability 2, we can define the minimum amount of total premiums by
applying again the Hoeffding (1963) inequality:
Prob
{
Yt > Ncγ + E [Y ]
}
< e−h2γ
Ng∑
g=1
wge
− h2
ng
E[Y g ]∏
c∈g
MX¯c,tac,t
(
h2
ng
)
, h > 0. (50)
Set
2 = e
−h2γ
Ng∑
g=1
wge
− h2
ng
E[Y g ]∏
c∈g
MX¯c,tac,t
(
h2
ng
)
(51)
and get
γ =
1
h2
log

∑Ng
g=1wge
− h2
ng
E[Y g ]∏
c∈gMX¯c,tac,t
(
h2
ng
)
2
 (52)
which in turn allows us to estimate the minimum allowable value of the sum of premiums
∑Ni
i=1 p
G
i mi:
Ni∑
i=1
pGi mi = Ncγ + E [Y ] . (53)
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3.3 Insurance model
The maximum value pHi that each individual is willing to pay in eq. (23) and the minimum amount
of total premium necessary to avoid excessive government risk-exposure
∑Ni
i=1 p
G
i mi in eq. (53) are the
two constraints that the supply faces when defining a national insurance scheme. The two equations
pose conditions on rates and they may either identify a range of possible values or fail to find a unique
solution. However, since we are focused on a publicly supported insurance scheme, it is reasonable
to assume that the government will keep the premium as low as possible in order not to financially
over-stress homeowners, though this may imply a higher probability of found refill at each t, thus a
greater risk for public resources. Therefore, given the desired probability 2 of government non-financial
over-stress we define the optimal premium level p∗i as:
p∗i = min(c, 1) · pHi with c =
∑Ni
i=1 p
G
i mi∑Ni
i=1 p
H
i mi
. (54)
Premiums as defined in eq. (54) are risk-based on municipality hazard and individual structural typol-
ogy, thus guaranteeing social fairness. Moreover, the equation implies that:
Ni∑
i=1
p∗imi = min(c, 1)
Ni∑
i=1
pHi mi = min
(
1,
1
c
) Ni∑
i=1
pGi mi = min
(
1,
1
c
)
(Ncγ + E [Y ]) = Ncγ
∗ + E [Y ] ,
(55)
thus γ∗ is
γ∗ =
min
(
1, 1c
)
(E [Y ] +Ncγ)E [Y ]
Nc
≤ γ (56)
and the insurer is thus able to guarantee an upper bound ∗2 on the probability to refill the fund equal
to:
∗2 =
∑Ng
g=1wge
− h2
ng
E[Y g ]∏
c∈gMX¯c,tac,t
(
h2
ng
)
eh2γ∗
≥ 2. (57)
Given the desired upper bound on insolvency probability 1, the optimal capital minimum requirement
W ∗d is then obtained from condition (45):
W ∗d = max
{
Ncφ+ E [Y ]−
Ni∑
i=1
p∗imi; 0
}
= Ncφ
∗ + E [Y ]−
Ni∑
i=1
p∗imi, (58)
with
φ∗ =
W ∗d +
∑Ni
i=1 p
∗
imi − E [Y ]
Nc
≥ φ. (59)
Thus, the optimal value ∗1 is:
∗1 =
∑Ng
g=1wge
− h1
ng
E[Y g ]∏
c∈gMX¯c,tac,t
(
h1
ng
)
eh1φ∗
. (60)
Since 1 decreases as φ increases, the optimal insolvency probability will be at most equal to the level
desired by the insurer: ∗1 ≤ 1.
Moreover, note that:
W ∗d = Ncφ
∗ + E [Y ] −
Ni∑
i=1
p∗imi = Ncφ
∗ + E [Y ] − E [Y ] − Ncγ∗ = Nc (φ∗ − γ∗) . (61)
From eq. (57) and (60), γ∗ and φ∗ can be defined as:
γ∗ =
1
h2
log

∑Ng
g=1wge
− h2
ng
E[Y g ]∏
c∈gMX¯c,tac,t
(
h2
ng
)
∗2
 (62)
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and
φ∗ =
1
h1
log

∑Ng
g=1wge
− h1
ng
E[Y g ]∏
c∈gMX¯c,tac,t
(
h1
ng
)
∗1
 . (63)
Given the condition in eq. (46), eq. (61) implies(∑Ng
g=1wge
− h1
ng
E[Y g ]∏
c∈gMX¯c,tac,t
(
h1
ng
)) 1h1
(∑Ng
g=1wge
− h2
ng
E[Y g ]∏
c∈gMX¯c,tac,t
(
h2
ng
)) 1h2 · (
∗
2)
1
h2
(∗1)
1
h1
≥ 1. (64)
In particular, if a parameter h = h1 = h2 is chosen, eq. (61) becomes
W ∗d =
Nc
h
log
(
∗2
∗1
)
. (65)
Eq. (65) shows that the amount of public resources needed increases with the ratio ∗2/∗1, and more
importantly, eq. (64) collapses to:
∗2 ≥ ∗1, (66)
indicating that insolvency should never be preferred to the disbursement of public funds, thus enforcing
the Government role of social guarantor. The minimum W ∗d value corresponds to 
∗
1 = 
∗
2 and is equal
to 0.
However, ∗2/∗1 affects W ∗d logarithmically, while the capital requirement is largely determined by
Nc/h. Therefore, W ∗d is directly proportional to the number of municipalities, and inversely related to
the parameter h, whose value is determined by the Government’s initial preferences 1 and 2 and the
overall risk distribution.
3.4 Application to Italy
3.4.1 Individuals’ willingness to pay for seismic policies.
Premium model application to the seismic case requires particular attention due to the hazard com-
ponent ζ = PGA. We can estimate pi(ζ) as pi(PGA) = |dλ(PGA)d(GPA) |. The absence of seismic movements
ζ = 0 corresponds to the case of no seismic event happening in the year, thus we have li,t(0) = 0 and
x (li,t(ζ)) = 0. This allows us to include the case of no seismic event in the integral term of condition
(23): ∫ ∞
0
pic(PGA) log
(RC − lai,t(PGA) + 1)
(RC − pi,t − lai,t(PGA) + x
(
lai,t(PGA)
)
+ 1)
d(PGA) = 0. (67)
In Section 2.2.1 we have shown that λc(PGA) approximately behaves as a Power Law distribution and
therefore we have:
pic(PGA) = |d(λ(PGA))d(PGA) | = αcPGA−βc , (68)
whose domain does not include values in [0, PGAminc [, with
PGAminc = e
log( αcβc−1)
βc−1 . (69)
This implies that, in this case, the integral in condition (67) cannot be evaluated in [0,+∞[ but in
[PGAminc ,+∞[ only. However, PGAminc take values ranging from 7.92e−09 to 0.002, and are small
enough to include the case of no seismic loss.
The loss function per structural typology laj,t(PGA) is derived from eq. (2):
laj,t(PGA) =
1
Kj
Kj∑
k=1
NLSk∑
LS=1
RC(LS) · [Pk (LS|PGA)− Pk (LS + 1|PGA)] , (70)
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with Pk (NLSk + 1|PGA) = 0.
Condition (23) for seismic risk becomes:
∫ ∞
PGAminc
αcPGA
−βc log
 RC − lai,t(PGA) + 1
RC − pi,t − lai,t(PGA) + x
(
lai,t(PGA)
)
+ 1
 d(PGA) = 0. (71)
3.4.2 Individuals’ willingness to pay for flood policies.
The premium model application to flood is simpler with respect to the seismic. Here, hazard is
represented by depth ζ = δ and li,t(δ) is obtained by the depth-percent damage curve gj(δ) for the
number of storeys j. The probabilistic component pic(ζ) is given by f(NF ) defined in equation (8),
whose estimation has been discussed in section 2.3.1. We define the individual flooding probability
from equation (13) as:
P (NF ≥ 1) = (1− fAPNF (0)) · extc,P3 ·
c¯f
NAPc
. (72)
The probability of no flood events in a year pic(0) is then defined as:
fNF (0) =
[
1− (1− fAPNF (0)) · extc,P3 ·
c¯f
NAPc
]
:= pic(0); (73)
while pic(δ) corresponds to:
pic(δ) = (1− fAPNF (0)) · extc,P3 ·
c¯f
NAPc
· fδ|NF (δ|NF ≥ 1) (74)
So condition (23) becomes:[
1− (1− fAPNF (0)) · extc,P3 ·
c¯f
NAPc
]
· log
(
RC + 1
RC − pi,t + 1
)
+ (1− fAPNF (0)) · extc,P3 ·
c¯f
NAPc
·
·
∫ ∞
0
fδ|NF (δ|NF ≥ 1) · log
(
RC − RC100gj(δ) + 1
RC − pi,t − RC100 · gj(δ) + x
[
RC
100 · gj(δ)
]
+ 1
)
dδ = 0. (75)
We focus on the integral in the second term, and split it into two components:
∫ ∞
0
fδ|NF (δ|NF ≥ 1) · log
(
RC − RC100 · gj(δ) + 1
RC − pi,t − RC100 · gj(δ) + x
[
RC
100 · gj(δ)
]
+ 1
)
dδ =
=
∫ ∞
0
fδ|NF (δ|NF ≥ 1) · log
(
RC − RC
100
· gj(δ) + 1
)
dδ+
−
∫ ∞
0
fδ|NF (δ|NF ≥ 1) · log
(
RC − pi,t − RC
100
· gj(δ) + x
[
RC
100
· gj(δ)
]
+ 1
)
dδ, (76)
then, we consider them separately.
Since gj is a positive non-decreasing function that becomes constant at level 100% corresponding
to a certain depth δmax, the first integral can be simplified to:∫ ∞
0
fδ|NF (δ|NF ≥ 1) · log
(
RC − RC
100
· gj(δ) + 1
)
dδ =
=
∫ δmax
0
fδ|NF (δ|NF ≥ 1) · log
(
RC − RC
100
· gj(δ) + 1
)
dδ +
∫ ∞
δmax
fδ|NF (δ|NF ≥ 1) · log (1) dδ =
=
∫ δmax
0
fδ|NF (δ|NF ≥ 1) · log
(
RC − RC
100
· gj(δ) + 1
)
dδ. (77)
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The second integral involves two piecewise functions: gj(δ) and x (gj(δ)). Defining δD such that gj(δD) ·
RC
100 = D and δE such that gj(δE) · RC100 = E+D and considering δmax, we can split it into 4 components:∫ ∞
0
fδ|NF (δ|NF ≥ 1) · log
(
RC − pi,t − RC
100
· gj(δ) + x
[
RC
100
· gj(δ)
]
+ 1
)
dδ =
=
∫ δD
0
fδ|NF (δ|NF ≥ 1) · log
(
RC − pi,t − RC
100
· gj(δ) + 1
)
dδ+
+ log (RC − pi,t −D + 1) ·
[
Fδ|NF (δE |NF ≥ 1)− Fδ|NF (δD|NF ≥ 1)
]
+
+
∫ δmax
δE
fδ|NF (δ|NF ≥ 1) · log
(
RC − pi,t − RC
100
· gj(δ) + E + 1
)
dδ+
+ log (E − pi,t + 1)
[
1− Fδ|NF (δmax|NF ≥ 1)
]
. (78)
Summing up, insured purchasing indifference condition (23) for the flood case study is:
[
1− (1− fAPNF (0)) · extc,P3 · c¯f
]
· log
(
RC + 1
RC − pi,t + 1
)
+ (1− fAPNF (0)) · extc,P3 · c¯f ·
·
{∫ δmax
0
fδ|NF (δ|NF ≥ 1) · log
(
RC − RC
100
· gj(δ) + 1
)
dδ+
−
∫ δD
0
fδ|NF (δ|NF ≥ 1) · log
(
RC − pi,t − RC
100
· gj(δ) + 1
)
dδ+
− log (RC − pi,t −D + 1) ·
[
Fδ|NF (δE |NF ≥ 1)− Fδ|NF (δD|NF ≥ 1)
]
+
−
∫ δmax
δE
fδ|NF (δ|NF ≥ 1) · log
(
RC − pi,t − RC
100
· gj(δ) + E + 1
)
dδ+
− log (E − pi,t + 1)
[
1− Fδ|NF (δmax|NF ≥ 1)
]}
= 0. (79)
3.4.3 Aggregate claim distribution
In order to apply the model, MX¯c,tac,t
(
h
ng
)
should be defined and perhaps some distributional
assumption should be introduced. The best distributional form depends on the scope of the cover-
age, and the analysis might rather compare multiple significant scenarios represented by alternative
distributional hypotheses.
An informative choice is focusing on the expected value of claims, and thus assuming that Yt is a
weighted sum of Bernoulli random variables. Assuming that the properties within a municipality are
perfectly correlated, Yt equal to:
Yt =
Nc∑
c=1
Xc,tMc =
Nc∑
c=1
McX¯c,t
∫ ∞
ζD
pic (ζ|ζ > ζD)x
[
lac,t (ζ)
]
dζ =
=
Nc∑
c=1
X¯c,t
∑
j
Mj,c
∫ ∞
ζD
pic (ζ|ζ > ζD)x
[
laj,c,t (ζ)
]
dζ =
Nc∑
c=1
X¯c,tac. (80)
Note that now parameters ac do not depend on time t and are constants. The expected reimbursement
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of the g-th group E [Y gt ] in eq. (34) therefore becomes
E [Y gt ] =
∑
c∈g
qcac =
∑
c∈g
pi (ζ > ζD)
∑
j
Mj,c
∫ ∞
ζD
pic (ζ|ζ > ζD)x
[
laj,c,t (ζ)
]
dζ =
=
∑
c∈g
pi (ζ > ζD)
∑
j
Mj,c
∫ ∞
ζD
pic (ζ)
pic (ζ > ζD)
x
[
laj,c,t (ζ)
]
dζ =
=
∑
c∈g
∑
j
Mj,c
∫ ∞
ζD
pic (ζ)x
[
laj,c,t (ζ)
]
dζ =
∑
c∈g
∑
j
Mj,cE
[
x
(
laj,c,t
)]
, (81)
and the moment generating function of X¯c,tac can be written through the probability generating function
of a weighted sum of Bernoulli variables:
MX¯c,tac
(
h
ng
)
= GX¯c,tac
(
e
h
ng
)
=
[
1 +
(
e
h
ng
ac − 1
)
qc
]
. (82)
However, since Bernoulli variables are bounded in [0, 1], each Y gt is bounded between 0 ≤ Y gt ≤∑
c∈g ac = bg. In the seismic model,
asc =
∑
j
xsj,c (83)
with
xsj,c =
∫ ∞
PGAminc
x
(
1
Kj
Kj∑
k=1
NLSk∑
LS=1
RC(LS) · [Pk (LS|PGA)− Pk (LS + 1|PGA)] ·
· |dλc(PGA)d(PGA) |
)
d(PGA), (84)
while expected claims for flood policies are
afc =
∑
j
xfj,c (85)
with
xfj,c = x
(∫ ∞
0
RC
100
· P (NF ≥ 1) · gj(δ)fδ|NF (δ|NF ≥ 1)dδ
)
=
= P (NF ≥ 1) · x
(∫ ∞
0
RC
100
· gj(δ)fδ|NF (δ|NF ≥ 1)dδ
)
=
= P (NF ≥ 1) ·
(∫ δE
δD
RC
100
· gj(δ)fδ|NF (δ|NF ≥ 1)dδ +
∫ ∞
δE
E · fδ|NF (δ|NF ≥ 1)dδ
)
=
= P (NF ≥ 1) ·
(∫ δE
δD
RC
100
· gj(δ)fδ|NF (δ|NF ≥ 1)dδ + E · λδ|NF (δE |NF ≥ 1)
)
. (86)
According to Hoeffding (1963), the bounds in eq. (39) and (50) simplify for the case of bounded
weighted random variables. Consider, for instance, the bound as in eq. (39)
Prob
{
Yt > Ncφ+ E [Y ]
}
<
Ng∑
g=1
wge
−h1φE
[
e
h1
ng
(Y gt −E[Y g ])
]
, h1 > 0.
According to Lemma 1 in Hoeffding (1963), since the final term in the right-hand side of the inequality
is convex, we know that:
E
[
e
h1
ng
(Y gt −E[Y g ])
]
≤ e
h1
ng
E[Y gt ]
[
bg − E [Y g]
bg
+
E [Y g]
bg
e
h1
ng
bg
]
=
= e
h1
ng
E[Y g ]
[
1 +
E [Y g]
bg
(
e
h1
ng
bg − 1
)]
= eL(hg). (87)
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L(hg) can be specified as
L(hg) = −hgpg + ln
(
1 + pg
(
ehg − 1
))
(88)
with
hg =
h1
ng
bg and pg =
E [Y g]
bg
.
According to the proof of Theorem 2 in Hoeffding (1963),
L(hg) ≤ 1
8
h2g =
1
8
(
h1bg
ng
)2
, (89)
hence the bound can be rewritten as
Prob
{
Yt > Ncφ+ E [Y ]
}
<
Ng∑
g=1
wge
−h1φ
(
e
1
8
(
h1bg
ng
)2)
=
Ng∑
g=1
wge
−h1φ+ 18
(
h1bg
ng
)2
. (90)
In order to get the best possible upper bound, we find the minimum of the right-hand side of the
inequality as a function of φ, thus obtaining
h1 =
4φn2g
b2g
. (91)
Substituting the parameter h1 as defined in eq.(91) into eq.(90), the Hoeffding’s bound simplifies to
Prob
{
Yt > Ncφ+ E [Y ]
}
<
Ng∑
g=1
wge
− 2φ
2n2g
b2g . (92)
Similarly, the bound in eq.(50) can be rewritten as
Prob
{
Yt > Ncγ + E [Y ]
}
<
Ng∑
g=1
wge
− 2γ
2n2g
b2g . (93)
3.4.4 Insurance model
We now revise the insurance model by applying the distributional assumptions in section 3.4.3.
Once again, parameters φ and γ are obtained by fixing the desired probabilities 1 and 2 equal to
the right-hand side of inequalities (92) and (93) respectively.
Premiums pHi are obtained as in section 3.4.1 and 3.4.2, and p
G
i are computed as in eq. (53). The
optimal premium amount
∑Ni
i=1 p
∗
imi is again computed according to eq. (54).
While φ∗ and γ∗ remain unchanged as in eq. (63) and (62),
∗1 =
Ng∑
g=1
wge
− 2φ
∗2n2g
b2g (94)
and
∗2 =
Ng∑
g=1
wge
− 2γ
∗2n2g
b2g . (95)
Optimal values φ∗ and γ∗ here cannot be expressed as explicit functions of ∗1 and ∗2 respectively, hence
eq. (61)
W ∗d = Nc (φ
∗ − γ∗) ≥ 0
cannot be directly related to the two probabilities. However, the equation implies φ∗ ≥ γ∗ and since ∗1
and ∗2 are inversely related to φ∗ and γ∗ respectively, the condition is satisfied if and only if
∗2 ≥ ∗1. (96)
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Table 8: Public-private insurance scheme for earthquake risk management.
1 = 0.01, 2 = 0.02
Deductible Maximum coverage
∑Ni
i=1 p
∗
i c
W ∗d ∗1 ∗2(per square metre) (Mln) (Mln)
0 1500 10735.784 1.394 7970.726 0.010 0.061(0.000) (0.021) (0.080) (0.000) (0.035)
0 1200 9725.082 1.505 8563.810 0.010 0.080(0.000) (0.021) (0.073) (0.000) (0.030)
200 1500 8837.312 1.576 8582.130 0.010 0.095(0.000) (0.021) (0.068) (0.000) (0.027)
200 1200 8221.215 1.652 8771.088 0.010 0.112(0.000) (0.021) (0.065) (0.000) (0.024)
Note: results are based on 100 samplings over the Nc = 6404 municipalities for which data were fully available. Policies
are defined on deductible and maximum coverage and listed by row, while columns represent the model’s relevant variables.
Reported values are mean and coefficient of variation.
Table 9: Optimal seismic premiums per square metre.
Deductible 0 0 200 200
Maximum coverage (per square metre) 1500 1200 1500 1200
RC.gl
min 0.460 0.460 0.034 0.034
mean 6.620 6.582 4.413 4.106
max 32.261 32.261 30.471 30.471
RC.sl
min 0.034 0.034 0.007 0.007
mean 2.005 1.676 1.351 1.350
max 10.226 10.226 8.922 8.683
A.gl
min 0.027 0.027 0.008 0.008
mean 1.902 1.712 1.536 1.424
max 10.200 10.197 9.269 9.124
A.sl
min 0.012 0.012 0.011 0.011
mean 1.745 1.535 1.278 1.205
max 10.153 10.153 7.810 7.696
M
min 0.075 0.062 0.041 0.041
mean 4.461 3.910 3.975 3.544
max 50.182 40.042 31.387 30.926
Note: the Table shows the minimum, average and maximum premium at the municipal level per each combination of
structural typology (row) and coverage limits (columns).
Similarly to the special case h = h1 = h2, the model indicates that providing additional public
resources should always be preferred to being insolvent. Coherently, W ∗d = 0 is obtained if and only if
∗1 = ∗2. Of course, the fund is again directly proportional to the number of municipalities Nc. Initial
preferences 1 and 2 and claim distribution are now reflected by φ∗ and γ∗ instead.
3.5 Results
The insurance model has been applied to the Italian residential building stock according to the
assumption discussed in section 3.4. Results here presented refer to initial preferences 1 = 0.01 and
2 = 0.02. The former value is representative of solvency requirement in Solvency II, the latter has
been fixed slightly greater than 1 according to the model description. In addition, we assumed r = 50
km, thus adopting a precautionary hypothesis on spatial correlation. This criteria allows for multiple
sampling solutions, each resulting in different optimal values of the relevant variables. Therefore, final
results have been averaged over 100 samplings.
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Table 10: Public-private insurance scheme for flood risk management.
1 = 0.01, 2 = 0.02
Deductible Maximum coverage
∑Ni
i=1 p
∗
i c
W ∗d ∗1 ∗2(per square metre) (Mln) (Mln)
0 1500 1021.072 5.644 7422.276 0.010 0.408(0.000) (0.035) (0.041) (0.000) (0.029)
0 1200 823.444 6.957 7567.733 0.010 0.534(0.000) (0.035) (0.040) (0.000) (0.028)
200 1500 1020.885 5.607 7366.177 0.010 0.402(0.000) (0.035) (0.041) (0.000) (0.029)
200 1200 823.257 6.898 7496.555 0.010 0.547(0.000) (0.035) (0.040) (0.000) (0.027)
Note: results are based on 100 samplings on Nc = 7772 municipalities for which data were fully available. Policies are
defined on deductible and maximum coverage and listed by row, while columns represent the model’s relevant variables.
Reported values are mean and coefficient of variation.
Table 11: Optimal seismic premiums per square metre.
Deductible 0 0 200 200
Maximum coverage (per square metre) 1500 1200 1500 1200
1 storey
min 2e-06 1e-06 2e-06 1e-06
mean 1.355 1.088 1.355 1.088
max 16.140 12.962 16.139 12.961
2 storeys
min 1e-16 1e-16 1e-16 1e-16
mean 0.198 0.161 0.198 0.161
max 2.382 1.933 2.381 1.933
3 or more storeys
min 1e-16 1e-16 1e-16 1e-16
mean 0.182 0.147 0.182 0.147
max 2.188 1.771 2.187 1.770
Note: the Table shows the minimum, average and maximum premium at the municipal level per each combination of
structural typology (row) and coverage limits (columns).
Four policies have been considered, differing on the level of deductible (none or 200) and maximum
coverage (none or 1200 per square metre). Note that deductible equal to 0 corresponds to the absence
of it, while maximum coverage equal to 1500 per square metre indicates that no maximum coverage
applies.
Results for seismic policies are reported in Table 8, where relevant variables are presented in terms
of their mean and coefficient of variation (CoV ). It can be noticed that the optimal premiums always
corresponds to the maximum price that individuals are willing to pay, pHi , as shown by (i) c ≥ 1; (ii) the
coefficient of variation of
∑Ni
i=1 p
∗
i equal to 0; and (iii) 
∗
1 = 1. When interpreting these findings, there
are two elements that should be carefully evaluated: individuals’ risk aversion and spatial correlation.
On one hand, because of risk aversion, individuals are keen to buy policies at a premium greater
than their expected loss; the more individuals are risk averse, the higher is the amount of premium
that the insurer is able to collect and, in turn, the lower is the additional capital needed to satisfy
the solvency constraint 1. On the other hand, spatial correlation between individual risks inflate loss
volatility and bumps the tail of the aggregate loss distribution, thereby increasing the amount of capital
corresponding to 1. Parameter c > 1 indicates that individual’s risk aversion is not sufficient to tackle
the risk-enhancing effect of spatial correlation at the aggregate level.
As a consequence of c > 1, the premium pGi that would satisfy the desired solvency constraint 1
and capital re-investment probability 2 does not meet market demand, and would generate a market
failure. This result suggests a potential weakness of the free market: since the government has easier
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access to capital markets than private companies, it is reasonable to assume that a private insurer will
require a probability of capital re-investment at most equal to the one desired by the government; under
this condition, pGi would be the minimum pure
5 premium that traditional insurers would be able to
charge to the homeowner, and the policy would not be purchased.
Limiting coverage might help the insurer controlling risk’s volatility, thus allowing for lower premi-
ums. In particular, being earthquakes low frequency-high intensity perils, the aggregate loss distribution
is strongly affected by rare events causing severe damages and therefore we expect maximum coverage
to reduce the insurer’s financial exposure more than deductibles. In Table 8 we can clearly notice that
increasing coverage limits reduces the overall minimum amount of reserves that should be guaranteed
at the beginning of each year Wmin =
∑Ni
i=1 p
∗
i + W
∗
d , but the minimum capital requirement W
∗
d in-
creases and ∗2 deviates more and more from the desired level. As confirmed by the greater values of c,
individuals are in fact reluctant to deductibles and maximum coverage due to increasing risk aversion6.
Coverage limits negatively affect individual willingness to pay, that in turn lower their contribution to
reserves and the insurer is left with an enhanced financial pressure. As said, limits-reluctance is here
generated by risk-aversion, but unfortunately c > 1 even for full-coverage policies, thus suggesting the
need for a government intervention on the private market.
Results for floods are collected in Table 10. Once again c > 1 and the need for a government inter-
vention in the insurance private market is even more strongly suggested (higher value of c). However,
deductibles are here beneficial to the insurer and, in fact, both W ∗d and 
∗
2 are lower when D = 200 ap-
plies. Though findings are completely different from the seismic case study, this evidence still generates
due to a combination of risk aversion and loss distribution. Being high frequency-low intensity perils,
floods mostly cause small claims on relatively low return periods and the aggregate loss distribution
therefore concentrates on low values. On the other side, increasing risk aversion makes individuals
extremely averse to high losses and less concerned about low damages that can afford by them own: in
Table 11, when applying the deductible D = 200, pHi remains substantially unchanged. Combining the
two effects, deductibles relieve the insurer commitment while not substantially modifying individual’s
willingness to pay.
By contrast, introducing an maximum coverage worsens the insurer condition by increasing both ∗2
and W ∗d . This effect is clear when comparing the policy (D = 0, E = 1500) with the (D = 0, E = 1200)
or (D = 200, E = 1500) with (D = 200, E = 1200). This limit in fact diminishes the risk of the
insurer by lowering the tail of its aggregate loss distribution, but leaves highest level of individual risk
to property-owners. Because of increasing risk aversion, the premium individuals are willing to pay is
therefore much lowered, and the amount of public funds needed much increased.
The most interesting result is obtained when comparing policies with estimated losses in Section
2.4: though earthquakes produce expected losses that are more than seven times greater than those
from floods, the minimum capital requirement W ∗d for the two hazards almost coincide. Once again,
the shape of the aggregate loss distribution and individual’s increasing risk aversion jointly determine
this surprising result. As low frequency-high intensity perils, earthquakes sometimes produce enormous
damages that individuals are extremely concerned about. Therefore, owners are willing to pay a pre-
mium consistently higher than their expected loss. On the other side, floods happen quite more often
but their damages are usually minor and can mostly be afforded by homeowners themselves. People
are risk averse, and hence keen to buy a policy and get rid of their flood risk, but the amount they are
willing to pay for the insurance service is lower. In other words, both the two premiums are higher than
the corresponding expected loss but the difference between the premium that the homeowner pays for
the earthquake policy and its expected seismic loss is greater than that of floods:
pH,si − E(Lsi ) > pH,fi − E(Lfi ). (97)
The higher is the difference between premiums and expected losses, the lower is the additional capital
needed by the insurance in order to manage the risk, and hence the lower is the capital requirement
5Without profit load and expenses.
6Risk aversion has been here represented by means of the utility function u(x) = log(x)+1, whose relative risk aversion
coefficient is increasing in x.
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Figure 10: Optimal premiums per square metre for earthquake policies on masonry buildings.
Note: the map refers to the full coverage (D = 0,E = 1500 per square metre) policy, that has been estimated over Nc =
6404. The minimum value reported is 0.075 and therefore yellow municipalities should be interpreted as approximately
0. The maximum premium is 50.182.
W ∗d . This becomes clear when considering the ratio
∑Ni
i=1 p
∗
i
W ∗d
. Ratios for seismic policies span between
0.93 and 1.34 and indicate that the government and the homeowners almost equally contribute to the
constitution of reserves. On the other side, flood risk is much unfairly distributed between the two
agents with ratios [0.11, 0.14].
Evidence suggests that spatial correlation strongly affects the development of the private insurance
market for both the two perils, but larger values of ∗2 indicate that flood risk is even more difficult to
insure. A second level risk transfer (such as a reinsurance contract or a catastrophe linked securities)
might help reducing 2 by lowering the aggregate loss tail.
To conclude, Figures 10 and 11 show annual optimal premiums per square metre pHi for the most
vulnerable structural typology per each municipality for the two perils respectively. Since premiums
are risk-based, the two maps reflect the hazard component of risk modeling and hence report a pattern
similar to the maps on loss per square metre in Figure 6 and 8.
4 Managing multiple hazards
In the previous section a public-private insurance model has been created for single peril policies.
As well known in finance, merging portfolios of different risks is beneficial if risks are uncorrelated, as
floods and earthquakes are likely to be. It remains to be seen whether benefits from risk diversification
counteract the negative impact of spatial correlation emerged in previous results. This section goes
through what has been discussed so far and extends the analysis to multi-hazard.
The first subsection is devoted to risk assessment, and therefore comes back to the risk-modeling
introduced in Section 2. While assessing single hazard risk is challenging, studying possible consequences
from several perils is even more complicated. Kappes et al. (2012) identifies two major issues raising in
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Figure 11: Optimal premiums per square metre for flood policies on one-storey buildings.
Note: the map refers to the full coverage policy (D = 0,E = 1500 per square metre), that has been estimated over
Nc = 7772.
a multi-hazard context: finding a common measure suitable to describing all the hazards considered,
and understanding the relationship linking them. Regarding the former issue, since it is impossible
to find a geological or atmospheric indicator describing both flood and earthquakes, the two risk have
been here assessed separately and compared in monetary terms only. The second point refers to the
correlation between the two phenomena. Based on some empirical evidence in the literature, we argue
that the two risks are uncorrelated.
To our knowledge, Marzocchi et al. (2012) is the only work addressing multi-hazard risk assessment
in Italy by studying seismic, volcanic, hydrogeological, flooding, landslide and industrial risk in the
municipality of Casalnuovo. However, this analysis is restricted to a municipality and has been applied
therein to human and societal risk only, and does not pursue any insurance decision. A different
framework is therefore needed for our case study.
The following subsection extends the insurance model in Section 3 to multi-hazard. The model is
shaped by redefining supply and demand. In particular, we show that the maximum premium that
individuals are willing to pay is equal to the sum of the premiums for the two single hazard policies,
while the required amount of public capital is less than or equal to the sum necessary when managing
the risk separately.
The last subsection presents results, which clearly show that benefit from risk diversification are not
sufficient to override the effect of spatial correlation. However, additional positive externalities emerge:
for example, premiums for multi-hazard policies are geographically more homogeneous with respect to
the single hazard’s, thus favoring the perception of fair-treatment among the population.
4.1 Risk assessment
As discussed in Section 2, four elements determine losses from natural events : H, E, V and L. A
mathematical model for loss estimation should therefore be able to capture the relevant characteristics
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of each component and describe those process that link them. Since every natural phenomenon has
specific characteristics, studying the effects of multiple hazards furthermore complicates risk assessment.
In particular, in our two-peril framework, H should encompass both floods and earthquakes and
therefore a common physical measure able to describe both the two perils should be identified. However,
given the different characteristics of the two perils, this is impossible, and we are able to compare the
two risks in money-value only. As a consequence, we are forced to assess the two risks separately,
though this approach cannot capture the potential dependence among them.
In our multi-hazard risk assessment, we refer to two hazard-indicators ζs and ζf , where apexes s
and f indicate seismic and flood risks respectively. Each indicator is associated to a certain probability
of occurrence F s(ζs) and F f (ζf ). Hence, hazard is described by both ζh and F h(ζh). As we have
previously shown, vulnerability functions are defined over a specific hazard-indicator, and their output
can be easily converted into monetary terms. Referring to the definition of loss in Sections 2.2.4 and
2.3.4, for simplicity we convey L and V in a unique function vh(ζh), with h = s, f . Expected losses per
square metre generated by a peril can hence be estimated as
lh = F h(ζh)vh(ζh)Eh, h = s, f. (98)
As anticipated, multi-hazard expected loss might be affected by potential interactions of the two perils,
and therefore we need some assumption on the degree of dependence between floods and earthquakes.
Unfortunately, our database do not offer any information about if and how the two perils interact,
but some empirical analysis in the literature (Tarvainen et al., 2006; Cesari and D’ Aurizio, 2019)
support the hypothesis of independence between seismic and flood risks. However, various degrees
of independence are also possible. Following the work of Brunette et al. (2015), we now discuss two
possible independence scenarios. First, we consider the hazards to be mutually exclusive, thus assuming
that floods and earthquakes cannot happen simultaneously and the structure can get damaged by one
peril only; we will refer to this case as “mutual exclusion scenario”. As an alternative, we consider perils
to be “mutually independent”, allowing them to potentially happen together. In this case, the property
may be damaged by at least one of the two events.
• Mutual exclusion scenario
If the two hazards are mutually exclusive the joint probability of an event FMHdep is obtained by
simply summing the single hazard probabilities
FMHexc = F
s(ζs) + F f (ζf ), (99)
and we can compute expected losses per square metre as:
lMHexc = F
s(ζs)vs(ζs) + F f (ζf )vf (ζf ). (100)
We can notice that in case of mutually exclusion the multi-hazard loss per square metre coincides
with the sum of the single hazards expected losses:
lMHexc = l
s + lf . (101)
• Mutual independence scenario
Avoid now any dependence and allow the hazards to happen simultaneously. The joint occurrence
probability FMHind becomes:
FMHind = F
s(ζs) + F f (ζf )− F s(ζs)F f (ζf ). (102)
Expected losses now arise from flood, earthquakes or a combination of the two. When the two
events happen together the damages suffered by the property are defined by a new vulnerability
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function vs+f (ζs, ζf ), therefore expected losses per square metre are obtained as:
lMHind =
[
F s(ζs)− F s(ζs)F f (ζf )
]
vs(ζs) +
[
F f (ζf )− F s(ζs)F f (ζf )
]
vf (ζf )+
+F s(ζs)F f (ζf )vs+f (ζs, ζf ) =
= F s(ζs)vs(ζs) + F f (ζf )vf (ζf ) + F s(ζs)F f (ζf )
[
vs+f (ζs, ζf )− vs(ζs)− vf (ζf )
]
=
= ls + lf + F s(ζs)F f (ζf )
[
vs+f (ζs, ζf )− vs(ζs)− vf (ζf )
]
.
(103)
We can notice that lMHind > l
MH
exc if vs+f (ζs, ζf ) > vs(ζs) + vf (ζf ) and this happens when the
interaction of the two events amplifies the damages they cause on the property. We are unable to
define the function vs+f (ζs, ζf ) or to state whether it is smaller or greater than the sum of the two
single hazard vulnerability functions. However, the low number of reported events suggests that the
associated probability F s(ζs)F f (ζf ) is reasonably close to 0. Moreover, assuming the expected multi-
hazard loss lMHind equal to l
MH
exc is a prudential assumption if vs+f (ζs, ζf ) < vs(ζs) + vf (ζf ) because it
requires the insurer to create slightly greater funds, thus effectively getting the probability of insolvency
and fund-refill lower than the required level. For these reasons, we estimate expected losses as:
lMHind = l
s + lf . (104)
4.2 Homeowner’s purchase decision
In Section 3 we have argued that premiums should meet the demand and that maximum rates that
individuals are willing to pay pose a constraint to an insurance model. Similarly to the single-hazard
policy, the demand constraint in a multi-hazard framework is therefore given by the equality:
uMHnot insured = u
MH
insured. (105)
Given the assumption of independence between floods and earthquakes and the individual utility func-
tions defined in Section 3, we can now address the multi-hazard purchase decision problem. We refer
to seismic events by means of the apex s and flood by f , and for simplicity individual loss li,t are
indicated by lsi,t for earthquakes and l
f
i,t for floods. In addition, single hazard and multi-hazard policies
are specified by means of apexes as SH and MH.
Given the probability of multiple events’ probabilities as defined in eq. (99) and losses computed
as in eq. (101), the reimbursement function in eq. (15) becomes:
xMH =

0, with probability pisc(0) + pi
f
c (0),
xs = x
(
lsi,t
)
, with probability 1− pisc(0), 0 < x
(
lsi,t
)
≤ lsi,t,
xf = x
(
lfi,t
)
, with probability 1− pifc (0), 0 < x
(
lfi,t
)
≤ lfi,t,
with i ∈ c, (106)
with
xh = x
(
lhi,t
)
=

0 if lhi,t ≤ D,
lhi,t −D if D < lhi,t < E,
E −D if lhi,t ≥ E,
h = s, f. (107)
Hence, individual utilities of being and not being insured in eq. (17)-(18) for multi-hazard policies are:
uMHnot insured =
[
pisc(0) + pi
f
c (0)
]
u(RC) + [1− pisc(0)]u(RC − ls) +
[
1− pifc (0)
]
u(RC − lf ) (108)
and
uMHinsured =
[
pisc(0) + pi
f
c (0)
]
u(RC − pMH) + [1− pisc(0)]u(RC − pMH − ls + xs)+
+
[
1− pifc (0)
]
u(RC − pMH − lf + xf ).
(109)
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In Section 3.1 the maximum premium that an homeowner is willing to pay for a single hazard policy is
the quantity pSH solving the equality:
uSHnot insured = u
SH
insured. (110)
with
uSHnot insured = pi
SH
c (0)u(RC) +
[
1− piSHc (0)
]
u(RC − lSH) (111)
and
uSHinsured = pi
SH
c (0)u(RC − pSH) +
[
1− piSHc (0)
]
u(RC − pSH − lSH + xSH), (112)
for SH = f, s.
Comparing MH and SH utilities, we get:
uMHinsured = u
MH
not insured = u
s
not insured + u
f
not insured = u
s
insured + u
f
insured. (113)
This equality states that the homeowner utility of buying both the two single hazard policies is equal to
the utility of buying a multi-hazard one. However, when evaluating one peril per time, policies prices
are fixed by solving a consume decision with two options - to buy or not to buy the policy-, but a
multi-hazard framework extends the range of possible choice: the individual may decide to buy a MH
policy, both the SH policies, one out of the two SH, or neither of them. We know that if the policy
is priced at pSH the individual is indifferent between buying or not the single-hazard policy, and eq.
(113) states that the sum of the two utilities equals the utility of buying a MH one. We should then
investigate the option of buying both the two single hazard policies (s+ f):
us+finsured ≥ u
s+f
not insured (114)
us+finsured =
[
pisc(0) + pi
f
c (0)
]
u(RC − ps − pf ) + [1− pisc(0)]u(RC − ps − pf − ls + xs)+
+
[
1− pifc (0)
]
u(RC − ps − pf − lf + xf )
(115)
while
us+fnot insured =
[
pisc(0) + pi
f
c (0)
]
u(RC)+[1− pisc(0)]u(RC−ls+xs)+
[
1− pifc (0)
]
u(RC−lf+xf ). (116)
Note that the premium paid by the owner in this scenario is ps+f = ps + pf . Assuming consumer’s
perfect rationality and neglecting any operational cost that a policy may generate, the individual
prefers a multi-hazard policy to two single-hazard ones if pMH < ps + pf because it implies that
uMHinsured > u
s+f
insured. Therefore
us+fnot insured = u
MH
not insured = u
s
not insured + u
f
not insured. (117)
which in turn implies:
us+finsured = u
MH
insured = u
s
insured + u
f
insured. (118)
Thus, the maximum premium that an individual is willing to pay for a multi-hazard policy makes him
indifferent between any purchase choice and is equal to
pMH,H = ps + pf . (119)
4.3 Public-private partnership
Main differences in risk-pooling single- or multi- hazard policies are determined by the different loss,
reimbursement and premium functions, that are now described by eq. (101), (106) - (107) and (119).
We now construct the fund WMH for multi-hazard policies by extending the single-hazard model.
The reader can find the extended description of the procedure in Subsection 3.2.
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The multi-hazard fund at the beginning WMH,bt and at the end W
MH,e
t of the year t, are now:
WMH,bt = W
MH
t−1 +
Ni∑
i=1
pMHi mi = W
MH
t−1 +
Ni∑
i=1
(
psi + p
f
i
)
mi with WMHt−1 = max(W
MH,e
t−1 ;W
MH
d ),
(120)
and
WMH,et = W
MH,b
t −
Ni∑
i=1
xMHi,t mi = W
MH,b
t −
Ni∑
i=1
(
xsi,t + x
f
i,t
)
mi. (121)
Assume that an earthquakes or a flood hits any building within a municipality and that every policy
can generate at most one claim per hazard per year. Square metre expected losses lMHi,t are equal for all
the individuals within the same municipality and so does xMHi,t . Given the number of inhabited squared
metres Mc =
∑
i∈cmi, the total claims value per municipality is:∑
i∈c
xMHi,t mi =
∑
i∈c
(
xsi,t + x
f
i,t
)
mi =
(
Xsc,t +X
f
c,t
)
Mc, (122)
and the total national amount is
YMHt =
Ni∑
i=1
xMHi,t mi =
Nc∑
c=1
∑
i∈c
xMHi,t mi =
Nc∑
c=1
(
Xsc,t +X
f
c,t
)
Mc = Y
s
t + Y
f
t , (123)
and therefore is equal to the sum of the national claims for earthquakes Y st and floods Y
f
t computed
by means of eq. (29). We model claim probabilities by means of Bernoulli variables X¯sc,t ∼ Ber(qsc)
and X¯fc,t ∼ Ber(qfc ) with qsc = pisc (ζs > ζD) and qfc = pifc
(
ζf > ζD
)
and apply equation (31):
YMHt =
Nc∑
c=1
(
X¯sc,ta
s
c,t + X¯
f
c,ta
f
c,t
)
. (124)
Assuming municipalities that are at least 50 km far each other to be independent, we can recall the
sample that have been created for single hazard policies. Considering the two hazard separately, we
will have Ng groups of municipalities’ seismic risks and other Ng groups for floods. Each group will
contain ng municipalities:
Y s,gt =
∑
c∈g
X¯sc,ta
s
c,t c = 1, . . . , ng (125)
Y f,gt =
∑
c∈g
X¯fc,ta
f
c,t c = 1, . . . , ng (126)
such that
YMHt = Y
s,1
t + Y
s,2
t + · · ·+ Y s,Ngt + Y f,1t + Y f,2t + · · ·+ Y f,Ngt . (127)
Defining wg =
ng
Nc
, the expected total amount of claims in Italy is:
E
[
YMHt
]
= E
[
YMH
]
=
Ng∑
g=1
wg
(
E [Y s,gt ] + E
[
Y f,gt
])
, (128)
with E [Y s,gt ] and E
[
Y f,gt
]
computed as in (34).
Applying the Hoeffding (1963) bound as in eq.(38)-(45), we get to the definition of both insolvency
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probability and Wd. We fix the insolvency probability 1:
1 = e
−h1φ
Ng∑
g=1
wge
− h1
ng
E(Y s,g+Y f,g)
E
[
e
h1
ng
(
Y s,gt +Y
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t
)]
=
= e−h1φ
Ng∑
g=1
wge
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E
[
e
h1
ng
(Y s,gt )e
h1
ng
(
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)]
=
= e−h1φ
Ng∑
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wge
− h1
ng
E(Y s,g+Y f,g)
E
[
e
h1
ng
(X¯sc,tasc,t)e
h1
ng
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X¯fc,ta
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c,t
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, (129)
and since seismic and flood risk are independent:
1 = e
−h1φ
Ng∑
g=1
wge
− h1
ng
E(Y s,g+Y f,g)
E
[
e
h1
ng
(X¯sc,tasc,t)
]
E
[
e
h1
ng
(
X¯fc,ta
f
c,t
)]
=
= e−h1φ
 Ng∑
g=1
wge
− h1
ng
(E(Y s,g)+E(Y f,g))∏
c∈g
MX¯sc,tasc,t
(
h1
ng
)∏
c∈g
M
X¯fc,ta
f
c,t
(
h1
ng
) . (130)
The minimum capital requirement for a multi-hazard public insurance is
WMHd = Ncφ+ E [Y ]−
Ni∑
i=1
(
psi + p
f
i
)
mi (131)
with
φ =
1
h1
log

∑Ng
g=1wge
− h1
ng
(E(Y s,g)+E(Y f,g))∏
c∈gMX¯sc,tasc,t
(
h1
ng
)∏
c∈gMX¯fc,tafc,t
(
h1
ng
)
1
 (132)
The probability of fund-refill 2 and the minimum amount of premiums
∑Ni
i=1 p
MH,G
i mi that the insurer
needs given a certain Wd are obtained by applying the Hoeffding (1963) bound as in (47)-(53). Hence,
fixing
2 = e
−h2γ
 Ng∑
g=1
wge
− h2
ng
(E(Y s,g)+E(Y f,g))∏
c∈g
MX¯sc,tasc,t
(
h2
ng
)∏
c∈g
M
X¯fc,ta
f
c,t
(
h2
ng
) (133)
we get
Ni∑
i=1
pMH,Gi mi = Ncγ + E [Y ] (134)
where γ is computed as:
γ =
1
h2
log

∑Ng
g=1wge
− h2
ng
(E(Y s,g)+E(Y f,g))∏
c∈gMX¯sc,tasc,t
(
h2
ng
)∏
c∈gMX¯fc,tafc,t
(
h2
ng
)
2
 (135)
4.4 Insurance model
The model for the definition of a public-private insurance scheme with multi-hazard policies can be
defined as in Section 3.3, therefore here we briefly extend the model to the multi-hazard scenario, but
the reader can refer to the previous Section for technical details.
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The two fundamental conditions are now defined by equations (119) and (134). The optimal pre-
mium p∗MHi is estimated as:
pMH
∗
i = min(c, 1) · pMH,Hi with c =
∑Ni
i=1 p
MH,G
i mi∑Ni
i=1 p
MH,Hmi
, (136)
from which we obtain
Ni∑
i=1
pMH
∗
i mi = min
(
c,
1
c
)
Ncγ + E [Y ] = Ncγ
∗ + E [Y ] , (137)
and the optimal probability of fund-refill ∗2:
∗2 =
∑Ng
g=1wge
− h2
ng
(E(Y s,g)+E(Y f,g))∏
c∈gMX¯sc,tasc,t
(
h2
ng
)∏
c∈gMX¯fc,tafc,t
(
h2
ng
)
eh2γ∗
, (138)
where γ∗ is
γ∗ =
min
(
1, 1c
)
(E [Y ]−Ncγ)− E [Y ]
Nc
. (139)
The optimal WMH∗d is estimated as in equation (58):
WMH
∗
d = max
{
Ncφ+ E [Y ]−
Ni∑
i=1
pMH
∗
i mi; 0
}
= Ncφ
∗ + E [Y ]−
Ni∑
i=1
pMH
∗
i mi =
= Nc (φ
∗ − γ∗) ,
(140)
with
φ∗ =
W ∗d +
∑Ni
i=1 p
MH∗
i mi − E [Y ]
Nc
, (141)
and the optimal value ∗1 is:
∗1 =
∑Ng
g=1wge
− h1
ng
(E(Y s,g)+E(Y f,g))∏
c∈gMX¯sc,tasc,t
(
h1
ng
)∏
c∈gMX¯fc,tafc,t
(
h1
ng
)
eh1γ∗
. (142)
As in the single-hazard scenario, some distributional assumptions are needed in order to solve the
model. We keep the assumptions as in Section 3.4.3, and therefore we represent Yt as a weighted
sum of Bernoulli random variables. We assume that the properties within a municipality are perfectly
correlated. Hence, the Hoeffding (1963) bound simplifies and the probabilities ∗1 and ∗2 become:
∗1 =
Ng∑
g=1
wge
− 2φ
∗2n2g
b2g (143)
and
∗2 =
Ng∑
g=1
wge
− 2γ
∗2n2g
b2g , (144)
where
b2g =
∑
c∈g
asc + a
f
c . (145)
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Table 12: Multi-hazard public-private insurance scheme.
1 = 0.01, 2 = 0.02
Deductible Maximum coverage
∑Ni
i=1 p
∗
i c
W ∗d ∗1 ∗2(per square metre) (Mln) (Mln)
0 1500
MH 11185.123 1.694 13281.008 0.010 0.091(0.000) (0.024) (0.068) (0.000) (0.029)
S 10356.859 1.424 8194.243 0.010 0.063(0.000) (0.022) (0.080) (0.000) (0.035)
F 828.264 6.346 7359.961 0.010 0.403(0.000) (0.036) (0.044) (0.000) (0.029)
0 1200
MH 10046.430 1.852 13983.445 0.010 0.120(0.000) (0.024) (0.063) (0.000) (0.025)
S 9378.433 1.537 8760.141 0.010 0.082(0.000) (0.022) (0.074) (0.000) (0.030)
F 667.997 7.820 7469.278 0.010 0.427(0.000) (0.036) (0.043) (0.000) (0.028)
200 1500
MH 9335.925 1.919 13879.044 0.010 0.132(0.000) (0.024) (0.061) (0.000) (0.024)
S 8507.814 1.612 8766.645 0.010 0.097(0.000) (0.022) (0.069) (0.000) (0.027)
F 828.110 6.305 7305.976 0.010 0.396(0.000) (0.036) (0.044) (0.000) (0.029)
200 1200
MH 8575.042 2.047 14183.694 0.010 0.163(0.000) (0.024) (0.058) (0.000) (0.022)
S 7907.199 1.692 8945.297 0.010 0.114(0.000) (0.022) (0.066) (0.000) (0.024)
F 667.843 7.756 7401.415 0.010 0.435(0.000) (0.036) (0.043) (0.000) (0.028)
Note: the Table shows multi-hazard (MH), seismic (S) and flood (F) insurance for the Italian residential building stock.
Results have been estimated over 100 samplings on Nc = 6217 municipalities for which data were fully available for
both flood and earthquakes. Policies are defined on deductible and maximum coverage and listed by row, while columns
represent the model’s relevant variables. Reported values are mean and coefficient of variation.
4.5 Results
For multi-hazard analysis, only municipalities where both seismic and flood data are available have
been considered, thereby restricting the database to Nc = 6217.
As in Section 3.5, municipalities have been assumed independent if centroids are at least 50 km far
and 100 samplings have been considered for final results. The four policies considered for single hazard
policies have also been estimated for multi-hazard: (i) a full coverage policy (D = 0, E = 1500); (ii)
one with a maximum coverage equal to 1200 per square metre (D = 0, E = 1200); (iii) one with a
deductible equal to 200 (D = 200, E = 1500); (iv) a policy with both the maximum coverage and the
deductible (D = 200, E = 1200). Initial preferences have been again fixed to 1 = 0.01 and 2 = 0.02.
Results are presented in Table 12 together with the corresponding single hazard policies, that
have been re-estimated on the restricted number of municipalities for the sake of comparability. As
expected, seismic risk dominates the multi-hazard scenario because of the consistently higher impact
on the national territory. In particular, since
Ni∑
i=1
pMH∗i =
Ni∑
i=1
ps∗i +
Ni∑
i=1
pf∗i , (146)
we can notice that multi-hazard premiums amount
∑Ni
i=1 p
∗
i is mostly determined by seismic risk and
just a small portion of it is due to floods. Though premiums for the two single hazard policies are
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Table 13: Optimal multi-hazard premiums per square metre.
Deductible
0 200
1s 2s 3s 1s 2s 3s
M
ax
im
um
co
ve
ra
ge
(p
er
sq
ua
re
m
et
re
) 1
50
0
RC.gl
min 0.644 0.592 0.591 0.051 0.051 0.051
mean 7.541 6.730 6.719 5.322 4.512 4.500
max 32.261 32.261 32.261 30.471 30.471 30.471
RC.sl
min 0.038 0.034 0.034 0.012 0.008 0.008
mean 2.932 2.122 2.110 2.195 1.384 1.373
max 16.951 10.679 10.638 16.935 9.277 9.248
A.gl
min 0.036 0.036 0.036 0.021 0.021 0.021
mean 2.849 2.038 2.027 2.478 1.667 1.656
max 19.136 10.793 10.730 19.111 9.625 9.595
A.sl
min 0.021 0.021 0.021 0.015 0.015 0.015
mean 2.684 1.873 1.862 2.221 1.410 1.399
max 18.860 10.283 10.272 18.614 8.165 8.136
M
min 0.092 0.092 0.092 0.058 0.058 0.058
mean 5.383 4.573 4.561 4.898 4.088 4.077
max 50.428 50.218 50.215 31.387 31.387 31.387
12
00
RC.gl
min 0.644 0.589 0.588 0.038 0.035 0.035
mean 7.315 6.666 6.656 4.818 4.169 4.159
max 32.261 32.261 32.261 30.471 30.471 30.471
RC.sl
min 0.037 0.034 0.034 0.011 0.008 0.008
mean 2.428 1.779 1.770 2.133 1.484 1.474
max 13.964 10.583 10.549 13.910 8.962 8.938
A.gl
min 0.031 0.028 0.028 0.011 0.008 0.008
mean 2.469 1.820 1.811 2.175 1.526 1.517
max 15.046 10.648 10.596 14.109 9.339 9.315
A.sl
min 0.015 0.012 0.012 0.015 0.015 0.015
mean 2.286 1.637 1.627 1.958 1.308 1.299
max 13.952 10.258 10.250 13.608 7.985 7.960
M
min 0.068 0.063 0.062 0.045 0.042 0.041
mean 4.641 3.992 3.983 4.275 3.626 3.616
max 40.891 40.168 40.157 30.926 30.926 30.926
Note: the table is divided in four sub-tables, each representing a specific combination of deductible (by column) and
maximum coverage (by row). Each sub-table presents minimum, average and maximum premium at the municipal level
per each combination of structural typology (row) and number of storeys (column).
extremely different, the corresponding minimum capital requirement W ∗d is similar (see Section 3.5),
and for the multi-hazard policy
WMH∗d ≤W s∗d +W f∗d . (147)
Therefore, multi-hazard policies need for less public capital than managing the two hazards separately,
and this finding is attributable to risk differentiation.
However, advantages from multi-hazard are evident with respect to flood risk, but a bit controversial
when we look at the seismic risk. The multi-hazard parameter c is a bit greater than that of the seismic
case and much smaller than in the flood case but, unfortunately, is always c ≤ 1. Our analysis suggests
that benefits from risk differentiation are not sufficient for the natural risks to be entirely managed by
the private market and once again, a government intervention is highly recommended. This evidence
is confirmed by the probability ∗2, that shows a behaviour similar to c and is always greater than the
desired level, and ∗1 = 1.
As far as coverage limits concern, the minimum amount of public funds W ∗d and the minimum
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Figure 12: Optimal multi-hazard premium per square metre for one storey masonry buildings.
Note: the map represents a full coverage (D = 0, E = 1500 per square metre) policy, that has been estimated on Nc=
6217. The minimum value represented is 0.092 and therefore yellow municipalities should be interpreted as approximately
0. The maximum premium reported is 50.428.
probability ∗2 are obtained with the full coverage policy, while applying a deductible D = 200 or a
maximum coverage E = 1200 lead to similar results. In any case, the worst solution would be applying
the two limits together, since both the greatest W ∗d and the highest 
∗
2 are here obtained.
In addition to benefits from risk differentiation, a government may prefer multi-hazard policies for
another interesting feature: risk-based premiums are much more geographically uniform than those of
single hazards. In fact, Figure 12 mapping premiums for the most vulnerable buildings (masonry-one
storey) shows a quite homogeneous price at the municipal level, while differences are a bit more empha-
sised in the corresponding single hazard (see Figures 10 and 11). From the public sector perspective,
a uniform rating system is desirable because it weakens the perception of unequal treatment between
the property-owners from different areas and therefore allows easier acceptance by the population. On
the other hand, different risk-based premiums signal the riskiness of the area to its inhabitants and
is therefore important to discourage the construction of most vulnerable housing structures and to
encourage preventive behavior. The current rating also preserves this desirable feature since premiums
are defined on structural typologies among which rates substantially vary (see Table 13).
5 Conclusion
Seismic and flood risks in Italy have been analysed. Given the limited amount of data available on
natural risks, an alternative approach based on risk-modeling has been applied to estimate expected
monetary losses. We found that seismic risk results in the highest expected losses at national level, but
floods may generate the highest losses per square metre. The two perils differ in geographic extent:
while the seismic risk is relevant for almost all the national territory, floods affect a limited area.
In order to cope with the effects of natural risks, a public-private insurance scheme has been pro-
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posed. Our insurance model is intended to alleviate the financial burden that natural events place
on governments, while at the same time assisting individuals and protecting the insurance business.
Therefore, in our model, propertyowners, an insurer and the government co-operate in risk financing.
Though expected losses generated by floods and earthquakes are considerably different, we found that
the amount of public funds needed to manage the two perils is almost the same. We argue that this
evidence is generated by a combination of individuals’ increasing risk aversion and hazard loss distri-
butions. Our analysis also shows that the amount of public capital necessary for risk financing can
be reduced by jointly managing the two risks. Along with this benefit from risk differentiation, multi-
hazard policies allow the insurer to apply rates that are more geographically homogeneous, therefore
favoring the perception of fair treatment among the population.
Unfortunately, our results show that neither single- or multi-hazard policies are sustainable by the
private market alone: due to spatial correlation among insured assets, the maximum premiums that
individuals are willing to pay do not meet the insurer’s solvency or capital constraints for any policy
considered. Without the government, a private insurer would be forced to drive up premiums, which
would not meet the demand and would therefore not be purchased. This evidence suggests the need
for the government to intervene in the insurance market for natural disasters.
To conclude, our results show that the probability of the government having to inject further capital
may be moderate. Though the insurance scheme reduces the government’s financial burden due to
natural perils with respect to the current state, adding some layer of risk transfer might be beneficial.
For example, CatBonds or some level of reinsurance may reduce losses suffered by the government and
their volatility.
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